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Werner Jaeger's *Paideia*

On The Reconstruction Of The Ideal Human Personality In The Philosophy Of Plato

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Abstract

Abstract of thesis entitled:

Werner Jaeger's *Paideia*
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Submitted by Chow Po-ping Ferrie
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If we have to figure out the most important classical scholarships in the 20th century, the German classicist, Werner Jaeger's (1888-1961) name must be mentioned and his three-volume classic *Paideia* is regarded as his most influential work.

In *Paideia* Jaeger deals with a subject rarely unexplored: what is the secret by which the Greeks established the ideal human personality? Through interpreting the original texts, Jaeger discloses to us that the ideal human personality is built up by *paideia* (education). This thesis attempts to follow Jaeger's view to reconstruct the relationship of the concept of *paideia* and the concept of the ideal human personality in Plato's philosophy, which dominates the whole *Paideia* project.

Jaeger pays special attention to Plato because the development of the ideal human personality reaches its peak at Plato's theory. In this thesis, I would limit my task to the second volume in which *The Republic* is the center of discussion. It is because it contains the essential ideas of Plato's educational thought.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction in which the general information on Jaeger and *Paideia*, the descriptions of the concept of *paideia* and the concept of the ideal human personality are included. In the second chapter I am going to follow Jaeger's view to take the first volume to investigate the pre-Platonic theories of the ideal human personality. In chapter three and chapter four, I shall tackle the theoretical aspects and practical aspects of Plato's theory of the ideal

human personality. In chapter five we shall reconsider Jaeger's reconstruction and discuss whether Plato's theory is still significant today through Bloom's, Popper's and Nussbaum's views; and I shall end my thesis with a conclusion, which is taken as the last chapter of this thesis.

論文摘要

耶格爾的《潘迪亞》

柏拉圖哲學中「理想人格」的重構

假若我們要列舉出二十世紀最重要的古希臘與古羅馬研究學者,那麼德國古典文獻學家耶格爾的名字必然被提及,而耶格爾的《潘迪亞》被認爲是他影響至深的經典著作。

在《潘迪亞》中耶格爾處理一個鮮爲人探索的主題: 希臘人藉著甚麼建立理想人格? 透過對古典文獻的解釋, 耶格爾向我們展示理想人格是建立於「潘迪亞」(教育)上。本文根據耶格爾的觀點來重構柏拉圖學說中「潘迪亞」與「理想人格」這兩個概念之間關係。

耶格爾的論述重點放在柏拉圖的「理想人格」學說上。 因爲在柏氏的哲學理論中, 整個古希臘「理想人格」理論發展至最高峰。而本文的討論範圍將會集中在《潘迪亞》第二冊。在此冊中《理想國》是討論的核心,因爲《理想國》是柏拉圖教育理論的要點所在。

本文分爲六章。第一章爲引言,主要簡單論述耶格爾的生平、《潘迪亞》一書的簡單介紹以及對「潘迪亞」與「理想人格」這兩個概念的略述。在第二章中,我會根據耶格爾的觀點以《潘迪亞》第一冊來探討「理想人格」在柏拉圖之前的發展。第三章及第四章我會分別處理柏拉圖「理想人格」理論方面的內容及實踐方面的內容。在第五章我會對耶格爾的重構作一重新考慮, 以及通過寶路吾、波普爾、魯斯班的觀點來討論柏拉圖的學說在今天是否仍然有其重要性。最後一章是全文的總結。

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Werner Jaeger's *Paideia*

On The Reconstruction Of The Ideal Personality In The Philosophy Of Plato

Chapter 1 Introduction

> "I present to the public a work of historical research dealing with a subject hitherto unexplored. It treats *paideia*, the shaping of the Greek character, as a basis for a new study of Hellenism as a whole. Although many scholars have undertaken to describe the development of the state, the society, the literature, and religion, and the philosophy of the Greeks, no one seems to have attempted to explain the interaction between the historical process by which their character was formed and the intellectual process by which they constructed their ideal of human personality." –W. Jaeger[1]

Werner Jaeger points out one thing: there are many scholars who have spent time on the developments of Hellenistic state, society, literature, religion and philosophy. However, no one seems to have attempted to explain how the Greek ideal of human personality is formed (P.I, ix). For this reason, Jaeger, in his three-volume classics *Paideia*, attempts to tackle this unexplored subject through interpreting the original texts (P.I, x). In this masterpiece, Jaeger discloses to us that *paideia* (education)[2] is

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[1] Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol.I: Archaic Greece .The Mind of Athens*, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), ix In this thesis *Paideia* Vol. I will be replaced by its abbreviation P. I

[2] Actually, "education" is not a very proper translation of *paideia* and we will have a more detail discussion on this concept in 1.3.

the conviction by which the Greeks build up the ideal personality. This thesis attempts to follow Jaeger's view to reconstruct the relationship between the concept of the ideal human personality and the concept of *paideia* in Plato's philosophy.

I take Jaeger's *Paideia* as the theme of my research for two reasons. Firstly, it provides us with a new point of view of studying Greek culture. It is because *Paideia* deals with the relationship between the ideal personality and *paideia*, which is seldom explored. Secondly, the question of the ideal human personality is one of the most difficult enquiries in the history of philosophy. What is the ideal human personality? How can a man build up the ideal human personality? We may find these questions are difficult to answer. For this reason, we should return to Ancient Greeks, which are the origin of the concept of the ideal personality in the western world, (P.I, xix) to find some hints to this important enquiry.

Before turning to a general introduction of *Paideia*, some knowledge of its author—Werner Jaeger, is necessary.

1.1. General information on Werner Jaeger

Jaeger (1888-1961),[3] the son of a Lutheran businessman, was born in 1888 at Lobberich. When he was a schoolboy studying in the local classical Gymnasium Thomaeum at Kempen in the Rhineland, he showed his interest in the study of Greek poetry and philosophy. After that, he attended the University of Marburg in 1907 and thereafter he moved to the University of Berlin, largely because Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Modellendorff, one of the most influential classical philologist at that time, taught there. Under Wilamowitz's influence, Jaeger decided to become a classical philologist rather than a professor of philosophy, as he once intended. Later he earned his doctorate under his master. After his doctorate he was called to the philological chair at the age of twenty-six at the University of Basel, which was once held by Friedrich Nietzsche. After a short stay at Basel and a few years teaching at the University of Kiel, he returned to Berlin in 1921 to be offered the prestigious chair, which was occupied for decades by Wilamowitz. During the era of the Third Reich Jaeger emigrated to America in 1934. In America Jaeger still remained active and held successively a professorship at the University of Chicago, the University of Harvard, the University of California and later at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.[4]

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[3] See W.Jaeger's atlas in Lewis A.Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America: their impact and their experiences* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp.274 – 275

[4] Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Humanism and Theology* (Milwukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), preface In this thesis *Humanism and Theology* will be replaced by its abbreviation HT

Jaeger's academic orientation is on redeveloping, interpreting, preserving and strengthening the classical studies. And this became his lifelong work.[5] His works include: *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (1912), *Nenesius von Emesa* (1913), *Aristoteles. Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (1923, English edition in 1934), *Gesellschaft fuer antike Kulture* (1924), *Gnomon* (1924), *Die Antike* (1925), eleven volumes of *Neue Philologische Untersuchungen* (1926-1936), *Plato im Aufbau der griechischen Bildung* (1928), *Der dritte Humanismus* (1934-5). *Demosthenes* (1938), *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (1947), *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (1961), *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture* and numerous papers (HT, preface). Among them, the three-volume *Paideia* is regarded as the most important and the most influential work of Jaeger. What is *Paideia* about? In the coming section we are going to give a general description of it.

1.2. General description of *Paideia*

The origin of *Paideia* could be dated in 1924 when Jaeger was teaching in Berlin. However, it was completed in America when Jaeger was teaching there.[6] The first German edition of *Paideia: Die Formung des griechischen Menschen vol. I* was

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[5] Cf. William M. Calder III,ed., *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), p.268
[6] Cf. Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America* p.275

published in 1933 while the first English edition *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture vol. I: Archaic Greece, the Mind of Athens* in 1939.[7] In this volume Jaeger describes the foundation, the growth and the crisis of Greek culture during the archaic and the classical epochs. These periods were dominated by the heroic, civic or political types of personality. And this volume ended with the collapse of the Athenian empire (P.I, ix). In 1943-44, both the second volume *In Search of the Divine Centre* and the third volume *The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato* were translated firstly in English from Jaeger's manuscripts, and the German editions were available in 1944 and 1947 respectively.[8] The second volume records the renaissance of the intellect, that was, the birth of "philosophy" out of the problem of *paideia* in the age of Plato. This volume traced the growth of philosophy in human life through the classical stage of its early unfolding, from Socrates' main question "Is education possible" up to its natural climax in Plato's *The Republic*[9]. The third volume takes up the general trend of the great reconstructive effort of the Periclean Empire after the Peloponnesian war. Even though the intellectual development in this period still shares the same point of view of its predecessor, it points to a different direction: it pursues the common sense

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[7] Cf. Jaeger, HT, preface

[8] Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Paideia:The Ideals of Greek Culture, Vol.II: In Search of The Divine Centre*, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), the translator's note (in this thesis *Paideia* Vol.II will be replaced by its abbreviation P.II), Jaeger, HT, preface and Beat Naf, "Werner Jaeger *Paideia:* Entstehung, kukturpolitische Absichten" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered,* p.125

[9] See Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of the Greek Culture, Vol. III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in The Age of Plato*, trans. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), vi In this thesis *Paideia* Vol. III will be replaced by its abbreviation P. III

and the empirical experience rather than first philosophy.

1.3. The concept of *paideia*

Being the title of this work, the classical Greek term *paideia* came into influence in the 5th century (P.I, p.4).[10] What is the meaning of *paideia*? According to *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, we obtain the following meanings:

1. In Aespchylus' *Seven 18* ----- rearing of a child;
2. In Aristophanes' *Cloud*, Thucydides' *2.39* and Plato's *Phaedo & Philebus* ------ training and teaching, education;
3. In Plato's *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Laws* and Aristotle's *Politics* ------ mental culture, learning, education, parts or systems of education;
4. In Euripides' *Trojan Women* ------ ropes of papyrus;
5. In Euripides' *IT 206* and Lysias' *20.11* ------ youth, childhood;
6. Other meanings ------ anything taught or learned, art, science, chastisement, body of youth;[11]

Jaeger points out that the meaning of *paideia* is not easy to define and to translate. Only the German word *Bildung* gets closer to the essential meaning of *paideia* (P.I,

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[10] Cf. Jaeger, P.I, p.418 n.7 .
[11] Cf. *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek, paideia,* online edition.

xxiii). [12] Nowadays we are inclined to render *paideia* into Modern English such as "civilization", "culture", "literature", or "education", but none of them really covers the essence of *paideia*. According to Jaeger, it is due to two main reasons (P.I, v). Firstly, the modern men define this classical Greek term *paideia* with their point of view, but not with the eyes of the ancient Greeks (P.I, v). The modern men investigate the meaning of *paideia* without reference to Ancient Greek history. Secondly, according to Jaeger, *paideia* is an organic whole (P.I, xxi), but we divide it into many isolated parts. Although we cannot say that "civilization", "culture", "literature", and "education" are inappropriate definitions, they are just confined to a part of the

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[12] About the definition of *Bildung*, Jaeger here does not have any further discussion. But we may investigate it with the help of Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (trans. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.Marshall (New York: Continuun, 1989, pp.9-19), Gademar focuses specially on the German word *Bildung*. According to Gademar, *Bildung* can be defined as the following: (a) according to Herder ------ rising up to humanity through culture; (b) according to Kant ------ "cultivating" a capacity or natural talent; (c) according to Wilhelm von Humboldt ------ something both higher and more inward, namely the deposition of mind which, from knowledge and the feeling of the total intellectual and moral endeavor, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character. In the rest of this part Gadamer himself discusses the definition of Bildung with Hegel's theory, but it is not necessary for us to go into details, we just need the main point. In p.11, Gadamer mentions: "the Latin equivalent for Bildung is "formatio", with related words in other languages ---- e.g., in English, "form" and "formation". In German, too, the corresponding derivations of the idea of *forma*--- e.g., *Formierung* and *Formation*--- have long lived with the word *Bildung*, Since the Aristotelianism of the Renaissance the word *forma* has been completely separated from its technical meaning and interpreted in a purely dynamic and natural way. Yet the victory of the word *Bildung* over *form* does not seem to be fortuitous. For in *Bildung* there is Buld, The idea of "form" lacks the mysterious ambiguity of Bild, which comprehends both *Nachbild* (image, copy) and *Vorbild* (model). In accordance with the frequent transition from becoming to being, Bildung describes more the result of the process of becoming than the process itself. The transition is especially clear here because the result of *Bildung* is not achieved in the manner of a technical construction, but grows out of an inner process of formation and cultivation, and therefore constantly remains in a state of continual *Bildung*, It is not accidental that in this respect the word *Bildung* resembles the Greek *physis*. Like nature, *Bildung* has no goals outside itself (The word and things Bildungsziel—the goal of cultivation—is to be regarded with the suspicion appropriate to such a secondary kind of Bildung. Bildung as such cannot be a goal; it cannot as such be sought, except in the reflective thematic of the educator.) In having no goals outside itself, the concept of *Bildung* transcends that of the mere cultivation of given talents, from which concept it is derived. The cultivation of a talent is the development of something that is given so that practicing and cultivating it is mere means to an end". Here Gadamer has given us a very clear discussion on the concept of *Bildung*, and later when we discuss Jaeger's definition of *paideia*, we will see why does Jaeger regard, "Bildung can clearly indicate the essence of *paideia*".

meaning of *paideia*, but not its essence (P.I, v).

Jaeger stresses that if we want to investigate the true meaning of *paideia*, two things should be borne in mind. Firstly, the essence of *paideia* can be grasped only if we do the investigation with the study of the ancient Greek history. Secondly, according to Jaeger, *paideia* is an organic union of civilization, tradition, literature and philosophy. It is because the Greeks have never seen the world as being cut off and separated from the rest, but always as an organic whole.[13] Only from this organic whole the separated parts derive their positions and their meaning (P.I, xx).

Neither the meaning of *paideia* is easy to define nor Jaeger gives us an exact definition of it. It is because Jaeger stresses that *paideia* can only be illustrated with the study of Greek history.[14] For a general meaning of *paideia* , we can refer to an

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[13] Jaeger's view is supported by Giovanni Reale. See Giovanni Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: From the Origins to Socrates,* trans. J.R.Catan (Albany: States University of New York Press, 1987), p.17 According to Reale, "wanting to explain the whole of reality" is one of the characteristics of the ancient Greek philosophy. In some extent, it reflects the Greek's view on the world as a whole. Reale says, "with respect to content, philosophy (ancient Greek philosophy) wanted to explain the *totality of things*, that is, *the whole of reality* without the exclusion of any part or aspect of it, thus distinguishing itself structurally from the special sciences that instead are limited to explaining particular sections of reality, groups of particular things, or particular phenomena. This aspect of philosophy already present in all its import in the first philosopher's (Thales) question—what is the principle of *all things?*"

[14] Actually Jaeger has defined what *paideia* is in P.I, but the definition is not very clear. For example, in P.I, p.303 Jaeger mentions "Originally the concept paideia had applied only to the process of education. Now its significant grew to include the object side, the content of paideia ---just as our word *culture* or the Latin *cultura*, having once meant the *process* of education, came to mean the *state* of being educated; and then the *content* of education, and finally the whole *intellectual and spiritual world* revealed by education, into which any individual, according to his nationality or social position, is born." The exact meaning of *paideia*, however, can hardly be reduced to a few sentences. It is because *paideia* is a developmental concept. In *Paideia* , as well as this thesis, a detail discussion on the meaning of *paideia* is given. But in the introduction, a general meaning of *paideia* is necessary. I

article of Union of International Association:

> The Greek term *paideia* refers to *education* looked upon as a lifelong transformation of the human personality, in which every aspect of life plays a part. Unlike education in the tradition sense, "paideia" does not limit itself to the conscious learning processes, or to inducting the young into the social heritage of the community of knowledge, it becomes the task of giving form to the act of living itself: treating every occasion of life as a means of self-fabrication, and as a means of self-fabrication, and as a part of a larger process of converting facts into values, processes into purpose, hopes and plans into consummations and realizations. It is therefore not merely learning; it is a making and shaping; and man himself is the work of art that *paideia s*eeks to form. Some leisure activities, particularly those with an element of risk or uncertainty, may be considered a necessary part of *paideia* as they allow for creative expression and may lead to flow experience and ego-transcendence.[15]

From the above paragraph, *paideia* (education) is a self-conscious activity of the human being towards a specific purpose: making and shaping the ideal human personality as every individual ought to be (P.I, p.4). The ideal human personality is the object that the Greek educators, poets, artists and philosophers intend to build up through their educational practices (P.I, xxiv). However, what is the meaning of the ideal human personality? It is the focus of our discussion in the next section.

1.4. The concept of the ideal human personality

Like the concept of *paideia,* "the ideal human personality" is a developmental

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choose the above article because it states clearly and briefly the general meaning of *paideia.*

[15] See the web-site: http://www.uia.org/uiademo/hum/ h0010.html

concept. Its meaning changes in different epochs. Jaeger says:

> The ideal of human character which they (the Greeks) wished to educate each individual to attain was not an empty abstract pattern, existing outside time and space, it was the living ideal which had grown up in the soil of Greece, and changed with the changing fortunes of the race, assimilating every stage of its history and intellectual development (P.I, xxiv).

The meaning of the ideal human personality can be understood only if it is directly connected with a definite historical situation. For examples, in the Homeric epic, the ideal human personality means mainly a person who fights bravely in the battle while in Tyrtaeus' poetry mainly a person who acts according to the law.

As the ideal human personality is a developmental concept, the methods of education are different in different epochs as well. For examples, in the epochs of Homer, Hesiod and Solon poetry played the predominant role in education while in Aeschylus' and Sopholes' times tragedy was the main educational instrument. .

According to Jaeger, making and shaping the ideal personality is not simply a matter concerning the individual man only (P.I, xiii). The ideal human personality can only be actualized through the state (the *polis*).[16] First of all, man, as Aristotle says

[16] See M.I.Finley, *The Ancient Greeks*, (Harmondsworth Middlesex: Peguin Books in association with

in *Politics*, is essentially a political animal (*zoon politicon*) (1253a2-3). Man cannot live without the state. Otherwise, he can no longer be regarded as a human being. Aristotle says:

> ……he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity: he is like the :
>
> Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,
>
> whom Homer denounces—the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an isolated piece at draughts (*Politics* 1253a4-6).[17]

The state is responsible for the education of its members (P.I, xxiv). At the same time, it is the source of all behaviors of its citizens (P.I, xiv). Every individual is requested by the state to perform the prescribed duty of the role he plays in the state. And the ideal human personality can be actualized only through fulfilling such duty.

In short, we have generally gone through the main theme—the relationship between the concept of the ideal human personality and the concept of *paideia*. In the development of the ideal human personality of the Greek culture, Jaeger pays special attention to Plato's thought. Why does Jaeger treat Plato's theory as the core of his

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Chatto & Windus, 1991), p.54 for a brief description of polis " the Greek word polis (from which we derive word like political) in its classical sense meant *a self-governing state*. However, because the polis was always small in area and population, the long-standing convention has been to render it *city-state*, a practice not without misleading implications. The biggest of them, Athens, was a very small state indeed by modern standard—about 1,000 square miles".

[17] See *Politics* in Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes ed., *The complete works of Aristotle, the revised Oxford translation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)

discussion?

1.5. Plato's theory of the ideal human personality as the center of discussion in *Paideia*

Plato's theory of the ideal human personality is the center of discussion in the *Paideia* project. [18] The three volumes two are used for discussing Plato's ideas and the first volume, as Jaeger says, "should be taken as an introduction to the study of Plato"(P.II, x). Why does Plato's theory play the predominant role in this work?

According to Jaeger, the development of the ideal human personality in the Greek culture reaches its peak at Plato's theory. Plato takes up his predecessors' thought and transforms their ideas, and then he builds up his theory of the ideal personality systematically on a higher philosophical level (P.II, x). In Plato's theory, we not only know his idea, but also the pre-Platonic theories of the ideal human personality. So Jaeger regards that Plato held a particular position in the Greek cultural development because his ideas were the clue to understand the mentality of the ancient Greek (P.II, xxi). For this reason, Plato's thought of the ideal personality is the core of the whole *Paideia* project.

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[18] Plato is the central figure of Jaeger 's research project. See Jaeger, P. II, xiv Jaeger says, "It was principally of Plato that I was thinking nearly twenty years ago, when I tried to draw the attention of

1.6 The task of this thesis

Jaeger reconstructs Plato's theory of the ideal human personality on the basis of a close reading of the original texts (P.I, x). In *Paideia* volume two and volume three Jaeger analyses *The Republic* and *The Laws* respectively because he regards them as the most important dialogues for illustrating the Platonic thought. In this thesis, I would limit my task to the second volume of *Paideia* in which *The Republic* is the focus of discussion. It is because *The Republic* is "revealed as the high point of Plato's educational activity" (P.II, p.96). At the same time, I am going to take other dialogues such as *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Meno*, *Symposium* as the background for better understanding of *The Republic*[19].

Basically this thesis will be based on Jaeger's discussion in volume II of *Paideia*. In the second chapter I am going to follow Jaeger's view to take the first volume to reconstruct the pre-Platonic theories of the ideal human personality; in the third chapter and forth chapter I shall tackle the theoretical and the practical aspects of Plato's theory and we shall have some discussion on Jaeger's reconstruction of Plato's

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scholars to that aspect of Greek history which the Greek called *Paideia*"

[19] Cf. Jaeger, P.II, p.80 According to Jaeger, when we investigate Plato's philosophy, one difficulty we have to face is "the problem of the dates at which the several dialogues had been written." " Can Plato's dialogues be recognized as the successive stages of an involuntary development of Plato's though, and with this we can determine the exact dates of the dialogues? Or, can we undertake Plato's dialogues by the purely mechanical application of language-tables, liked what Schleiermacher did, to determine the exact dates of every dialogue?" The disputes on the dates of Plato's numerous dialogues, however, is not my task here.

theory in Chapter Five.

In this thesis, as I have pointed out above, I shall limit my discussion to Plato's thought of the ideal human personality as unfolded in *The Republic*.[20] Before getting into the main theme, we shall have our discussion on the background of Plato's theory—the pre-Platonic ideas of ideal personality, in the coming chapter.

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[20] In this thesis, it is limited to Plato's thought of the ideal personality bases mainly on *The Republic*. The other specific discussions such as the problem of the publish dates of Plato's dialogues, the Socratic problem and the problem of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, however, are not included in this work.

Chapter 2 Theories of the ideal human personality before Plato

No one will deny that Plato is one of the most important and influential philosophers in the western world. The structure and the content of Plato's philosophy did not come from Plato himself alone; indeed his predecessors influenced him. For this reason, Jaeger in *Paideia* volume I focuses his discussion on the great figures before Plato because they did form the background for Plato's philosophy. These great figures include: Hesiod, Tyrtaeus, Archilochus, Solon, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Pindar, Theognis, Aeschylus, Sopholes, Protagoras, Callicles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides and the most importantly his teacher, Socrates. Jaeger intends to show how Plato took up and transformed their ideas, and then built up his own philosophy. So, the ideas of these great men form the important background for investigating Plato's theory of the ideal human personality. In this chapter, I am going to give a general description of the theories of the ideal personality before Plato based on the first volume of *Paideia.* First of all I shall start our discussion with an important concept since Homer------*areté*. The concept of *areté* is one of the most important concepts in Jaeger's masterpiece because it always goes with *paideia* and the development of the ideal human personality.

2.1. The general meaning of *areté*

According to Jaeger, *areté* is a key concept in the theory of the ideal human personality. What is its relationship with *paideia* and the ideal personality?

As we have mentioned in the introduction, the goal of *paideia* is to make and shape the ideal human personality. According to Jaeger, "the word (*paideia*) does not occur before the fifth century"(P.I, p.4).[21] Even in the earliest examples the word *paideia* was still used in the narrow sense of "child-rearing" rather than "education" in the later and deeper sense (P.I, p.4-5). Before the concept of *paideia* became significant, the educational practice in ancient Greece had the same goal as *paideia* did—building up the ideal human personality. What does it mean? The ideal human personality is built up only if *areté* is fully actualized. In other words, the goal of *paideia* is the actualization of *areté* because "building up the ideal human personality" and "actualizing *areté*", indeed, have the same meaning.

What is *areté*? In Modern English *areté* is usually translated as *excellence* or *virtue*. While in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, neither *excellence* nor *virtue* is taken as the proper translation of *areté*, the latter is rather translated as "*goodness*".

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[21] See also Jaeger, P.I, p.418 n. 7

It is because in ancient Greek, *areté* functions as the abstract noun correlated with *agathos*, which means "good".[22] Nevertheless, in *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, the word *areté* is not totally equal to *excellence, virtue* or *goodness*:

(1) When *areté* is used to describe human being: goodness and excellence of any kind such as courage, wisdom, valour, brave deeds, forms of excellence, good natures, kindness;

(2) When *areté* is used to describe gods: glorious deeds, wonders, miracles;

(3) When *areté* is used to describe animals and things: for examples, a productive land;

(4) When *areté* is used to talk about prosperity: active merit, good service, reward of excellence, distinction, fame, of the praises of the gods;[23]

From the above definitions, the word *areté* means more than *excellence, virtue* or *goodness* in the general sense. In fact *areté* is difficult to define and Jaeger states that "there is not complete equivalent for the word *areté* in modern English" (P.I, p.5). *Areté* can hardly be reduced to a single definition. From the above definitions we can only get some hints of the characteristics of *areté*. In the Greek sense *areté* is always used in a wider sense to prescribe things in the universe. It is used to prescribe "not

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[22]Cf. *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, areté*, online edition.
[23]Cf. *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek, areté* ,online edition.

only the human merit but the excellence of non-human things"(P.I, p.5) It is because the Greeks always see the universe as a united whole. For this reason, they use the same standard--*areté* to rank everything according to his/its virtues and excellence (P.I, p.5)

Besides, it is clear that *areté* covers many different kinds of virtues such as courage, wisdom or intellect. The meaning of *areté*, moreover, changes according to different epochs and different theories. For example, *areté* in the Homeric sense means mainly *courage* (P.I, p.7) while from Tyrtaeus' point of view *justice* (P.I, p.105). As the meaning of *areté* changes, the definition of the ideal human personality changes accordingly. In the next section, we begin our investigation of the historical origin of the concept of *areté* in Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (P.I, xxiii).[24]

[24] There has been a series question concerning *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*, and Homer as well. See Finley, *The Ancient Greeks,* p. 19. Finley says, "The Greeks, with few exceptions, understood the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to be the work of a single poet, Homer. No one was certain when he lived or where. Modern students are divided on the questions whether or not poems were composed by one poet, and on their date." But Jaeger in P.I, p. 15 points out, "In considering the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* as historical evidence for early Greek civilization, we cannot treat them as a unity, as the work of one poet. We do in practice continue to speck of 'Homer'; so did the ancients, who originally subsumed many other epics under the same name 〈 ..... 〉 Historically, it is clear that *Iliad* is a work of greater antiquity than *Odyssey*, and that the *Odyssey* portrays a later stage of civilization." The dispute on the dates and the author of two great Homeric epic poetries, however, is not the main task of this thesis.

2.2. The concept of *areté*, the theory of the ideal human personality and the educational method in the Homeric epic

The origin of the concept of *areté* can be traced back to the Homeric epic. In *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, *areté* is used in a board sense to denote virtues or excellence of any kind. Hence the meaning of *areté* is different in different cases. For example, the real *areté* of women is beauty while men is intellectual and physical excellence (P.I, p.22). But in most cases *areté* prescribes mainly the strength and skill of a warrior or athlete in the battle of the warlike age (P.I, p.6).

In the Homeric sense, *areté* is limited to the aristocracy (or noblemen) only and Jaeger tries to explain this with two ancient Greek concepts, which are correlated with *areté*: *aristos* and *agathós*. Firstly, the English word "aristocracy" originally comes from *aristos*, which has the same root as *areté*. But the meaning of *aristos* is more than what we mean today in terms of "nobility" or "the highest social class"; indeed it is used to indicate mainly a group of talent.[25] Secondly, the adjective *agathos*, which is translated as *good*, but seldom means *moral virtue* (P.I, p.6), corresponds to *areté* though it is derived from a different root.[26] *Ágathos*, which denotes mainly *brave*,

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[25] Cf. *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, *aristos* ,online edition. *Aristos* can be defined as: (1) Of persons------ (a) Best in birth and rank, noblest, a chief; (b) Best in any way, bravest, readiest, easiest; (c) morally best; (d) best, most useful. (2) Of animals------best, finest. (3) Other definitions------best, most excellently, well said

[26] Cf. *ibid.*,The concept of *agathós* is applicable to both of human and non-human things. (1) Of

noble and *capable*, is used to prescribe the noblemen only.

From the above explanation, it is clear that *areté* is not available for everyone because it is an attribute of the noblemen only; but one thing we have to bear in mind: even though the noblemen have *areté*, they possess it only potentially. If the noblemen do not actualize their *areté*, they are just like ordinary men. So, the real *areté* can only be obtained through actualizing their strength and skill, that is, victory in the battle (P.I, p.6).[27]

A real nobleman has to actualize his *areté* in the battle because of two main reasons. Firstly, a real nobleman has a thirst for honor. The highest honor can only be obtained through actualizing his *areté* in the victory of the battle. For the love of honor, he is willing to give up his life, as Achilles did in *Iliad*.[28] Secondly, actualizing the *areté* is his duty to the state. A real nobleman is required by the society to perform the prescribed duty of the role he plays in the state (P.I, p.7). So, Achilles took

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human being------ (a) Well-born, gentle; (b) Of the political sense which is attributed to the aristocrats: brave and valiant attributed to the chiefs and noble, good and capable in reference to ability; (c) Of the moral sense: good. (2) Non-human things------good, serviceable, blessing, benefit, good of fortune, wealth, treasures.

[27] Cf. Jaeger, P.I, p.6 According to Jaeger, *areté*, *aristos* and *agathós* are the military connotations.

[28] Cf. Homer, *Iliad*, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1990), book 18,112-113 Achilles decided to take revenge on Hector for killing his closest friend Patroclus even he knew very well that his death was to come soon after Hector's. In 1,600 Achilles' goodess mother Thetis entreats Zeus and says, "Zeus, Father Zeus! 〈 ..... 〉 Honor my son Achilles! 〈 ..... 〉 doomed to the shortest life of any man on earth. And now the lord of men Agamennon has disgraced him, seizes and keeps his prize 〈 ..... 〉 Olympian Zeus, your urgings rule the world! Come, grant the Trojans victory after victory till

revenge for Patroclus not only for his love of honor, but also it was his duty to do so. If he did not perform his duty, he would be blamed by the state and he would live a life of shame! The real nobleman has thirst for honor, but he is rewarded with honor by his state only when he fulfills his duty.

The ideal human personality can only be established through cultivating his *areté* to the perfect goal. In Homeric epic Achilles is considered as the model of such ideal (P.I, p.11). The model of the ideal man is very important because it plays a very important role in education. In Homeric epoch, there was neither a code of law nor a system of ethics for moulding the ideal personality. For this reason, the ideal personality was established on the ideal model of the Homeric ideal man (P.I, p.21), as Telemachus did (P.I, p.33).[29] The aim of education is to make man to become a real nobleman.

Homeric epic played the predominant role in the Greek *paideia*. Homer was not only the real educator of Greece, but also of the western world. The latecomers such as Hesiod, Solon and Pindar were all under the influence of this great master. Even

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the Achaean armies pay dear son back, building higher the honor he deserved!"

[29] Cf. Jaeger, P.I, p.33 According to Jaeger, in *The Odyssey* Telemachus had an apt model of "Orestes who revenged himself on Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra for murdering his father", to imitate during his training as a man". See also Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. E.V.Rieu (London: Penguin, 1991), book 1,298-302

though Plato criticized Homeric poetry, Plato himself could not deny that Homeric poetry was part of the backgrounds for his philosophy.

2.3. The concept of *areté*, the theory of the ideal human personality and the educational method: from Hesiod to Pythagoras

From the time of Hesiod to Pythagoras, poetry played the predominant role in the Greek *paideia* and the poets maintained their role of educators. To a certain extent it is right to call those poets such as Hesiod and Solon the successors of Homer. It is because they followed the Homeric model and they borrowed the mythical element from *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey.*[30] The nature of the poetry, however, was different from Homeric epic. It turned away from the heroic world to the world of humanity.[31] *Man*, who was a living creature existing within a definite time and space, became the center of poetry. Jaeger says that poetry was born for the need of man "to see and solve the problem of human life outside the mythical content of Homeric epic poetry" (P.I, p.127).[32] "The world of man" replaced "the world of gods" while the state replaced the God as the center of human life. And the most revolutionary change was

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[30] Cf. Jaeger, P.I, pp.64-65 Jaeger points out that Hesiod in *Works and Days* followed Homer to employ the religious language and a system of myths was currently used.

[31] *Ibid.*, p.57 Jaeger says that Hesiod in *Works and Days* gave us "a vivid record of the life of peasantry in the mainland Greece about the end of eighth century".

[32] *Ibid.*, pp.62 and 139 For examples, Jaeger says that Hesiod sought for the importance of *justice* because he saw the problems rising from *injustice;* and in Solon's poetry the main concern was the life of common people.

the meaning of *areté*.

In Homeric sense neither the unified characteristics of *areté* nor the very concept of *areté par excellence* existed. But the Homeric *areté* denoted mostly the excellence of victory in the battle; hence *areté par excellence* was "courage". From the time of Hesiod to Pythagoras, *areté par excellence* was *dikaiosyné*, which comes from the word *diké* --"justice" or "righteousness" (P.I, p.105).[33] Actually, the idea of *justice* could be traced back to Homer (P.I, p.103)[34] and it implies two important concepts: "equality" and "law".

In Homeric epoch, *areté* was limited to the aristocracy, but in *Works and Days* Hesiod suggested that *areté* should be possible for everyone in the state (P.I, pp.68-69). In this view, the idea of justice implies the concept of "equality". The meaning of the ancient ideal of "justice" and the meaning of equality are in fact interpenetrated. The most significant is that the concept of equality indicates mainly "political equality", which did not exist in the Homeric epic. In this way, both justice

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[33] Cf. *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek, diké*, online edition. *Diké* can be defined as: (1) Customs, usage, in the way of, after the manner of, nothing short if what is fit; (2) In preference to legal proceedings------order, right, duly, rightly; (3) Of judgment------giving judgment most righteously; (4) Of proceeding instituted to determine legal rights------lawsuit, trial of the case, the object or consequence of the action, atonement, satisfaction, penalty. On the other hand

[34] See Jaeger, P.I, p.103 According to Jaeger, Homer usually described "justice" by another word *themis* rather than *diké*. *cf. Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, online edition. *Themis* meant: (1) that whish is laid down or established, law as established by customs; (2) decrees of the gods, oracles; (3) dooms, customary laws, ordinances; (4) judgments, decision given by the kings or

and equality have political connotations.

Politically speaking, everyone is a member of the state and so every citizen should have the right to participate in the public affairs. For this reason, *justice* means that each citizen ought to have an equally active part in the administration and should fulfill his duty in his state (P.I, p.104). And "law", which must be obeyed by every citizen, is introduced in order to guarantee this political equality. In this sense "act according to the law" and "act according to justice" share the same meaning.

Law, as Jaeger regards, "was the most universal and permanent form of Greek moral and legal experience" (P.I, p.109). In Homeric epic poetry, Homer regarded that the whole universe was an orderly whole under the government of one law, that was the universal law or the law of God (P.I, p.51). The ancient Greek thinkers generally followed this Homeric view, but their main focuses were different. Some great men, such as the three great figures of the Miletus School,[35] focused on "the law of the universe"; while the others such as Hesiod and Solon treated "the law of the state" as their main task. One question to be raised: what is the relationship between "the law

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judges; (5) tribute, dues.

[35] Cf. Jaeger, P.I, p.152 According to Jaeger, the leading question of these three great Miletus School's figures Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes is: what is the inexhaustible substance from which everything is born and into which everything passes? In p.158 Jaeger states that among these three Anaximander is regarded as the most important because he was the pioneer of discovering that the

of the universe" and "the law of the state"? Are they essentially the same or different? Or are they compatible with or contradictory to each other?[36]

"The law of the universe" and "the law of the state" are essentially neither different nor contradictory to each other. Indeed they are compatible with each other and Jaeger tries to explain this by the concept of "the inner law of man". In the process of making the law of the state, the lawmaker gives his decisions in accordance with the law of the universe, which is set up by the god, and "derives their rules from his knowledge of customary law and from his intuition" (P.I, p.103). Man discovers his own inner law, which is essentially the same as the law of the universe through his intuition. In this way, there is no disagreement between the law of the universe, the inner law of man and the law of the state because they form a harmonious unity. So, in this epoch the law became the educator of the state and "act according to the law" was the basis for the ideal human personality.

Can a man discover his inner law in order to establish the ideal personality?

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world works orderly.

[36] Actually, the question whether the law of cosmos and the law of the state are compatible or are contradictory to each other is being widely discussed throughout the Greek *paideia*. For example, in *Gorgias* (484c) Callicles insists that these two laws indeed are contradictory to each other: according to the law of cosmos, it is just that the stronger uses his strength to take advantages over the weaker; but the law of the state is made in order to protect the weaker. However, Plato denies this view immediately and his view will be discussed in chapter 3. See *Gorgias* in Plato, *Plato III*, trans., W.R.M.Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991)

Anaximander said that the discovery of the law is by human soul---wisdom. "Wisdom" or "prudence" is another important *areté* besides *justice*. The concept of wisdom, of which we are going to discuss in the next section, is the *areté par excellence* at the time from Xenophanes to Thucydides.

2.4. The concept of *areté*, the theory of the ideal human personality and the educational method: from Xenophanes to Thucydides

In this period "man" was still the focus of the poetry, and the later the sophist's theory and tragedy.[37] But the most revolutionary change was "the rise of philosophy" and "the rise of wisdom". The concept of god of Homer and Hesiod was abandoned. It was replaced by natural and logical explanation (P.I, p.170). [38] Now *sophia* —wisdom[39] was the only solution to human problems and it became *areté par excellence* (P.I, p.174).[40]

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[37] For example, Protagoras' famous saying, "Of all things the measure is Man". See this fragment in Kaufman W & E. Baird F.ed., *Philosophic Classics* vol. I (Englewood Cliffs: Prientice Hall, 1994), p.47

[38] Cf. Jaeger, P.I, p.170. For examples, Xenophanes, who criticized Homer's and Hesiod's anthropomorphic conception of gods, held that "the God is the same as the whole universe". See also the fragment of Xenophanes' concept of god in Kaufman W & E. Baird F.ed., *Philosophic Classics* vol. I, p.14

[39] Cf. *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, *sophia*, online edition *Sophia* can be defined as: (1) Cleverness or skill in handcraft and art; (2) Skill in matters of common life such as sound judgment, intelligence, practical wisdom; (3) Learning including natural philosophy and mathematics; (4) An attribute and the Spirit of God.

[40] See Jaeger, P.I, .174 Jaeger writes, "Xenophanes 〈 ..... 〉 ideal marks the last stage of the development of he political conception of *areté*: first came courage, then prudence and justice, and now finally wisdom—the virtue which Plato retained as the essence of the citizen's highest *areté*".

The ideal personality is based on "acting according to the law" or "acting according to justice", as we have mentioned in the previous section. The understanding of the law must start with man himself through his "wisdom". "Wisdom" in this epoch "supersedes of all earlier ideals, by assimilating them and made them subordinated to itself" (P.I, p.174). "Justice and law, right order and welfare" in the state are all derived from this highest *areté* (P.I, p.174). For this reason, the great authors including Xenophanes[41], Heraclitus[42], Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and the later sophists all ranked "wisdom" as the *areté par excellence* and their focus was "actualizing" this highest *areté* for the sake of achieving the ideal human personality.

How is the actualization of wisdom possible? "Can *areté* be taught" or, "Is human nature educable" was the focus of dispute in this period. In Homeric sense, aristocracy was the only group that possessed *areté*. It seemed that the ancient Greeks believed that *areté* lies in the blood of a noble family. But did they also believe that *areté* could be achieved through education (P.I, p.218)? Pindar, who was the admirer of aristocratic culture, used to recur to this question of whether *areté* could be learnt

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[41] *Ibid.*, p.170 Jaeger regards that Xenophanes, who was "a pioneer in the poetic preservation of philosophical reasoning", was the first one telling the Greek that philosophy could be the cultural force.
[42] *Ibid.*, p.180 Jaeger says that Heraclitus used the concept of *phrónesis* instead of *sophia*. See *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek, phronesis*, online edition. *Phrónesis* can be defined as: "purpose", "intention", "thought","sense", "judgment", "arrogance", "pride", "practical wisdom",

or only inherited by blood (P.I, p.218). Sophocles, who was the first one to recognize that "soul" (*psyche*) was of central importance in all culture (P.I, p.279), believed that human nature was educable and a human soul could be formed like a body (P.I, p.279). Whether education is possible or not is the main dispute between the sophists and Plato and it is one of our main concerns in Chapter Three.

"prudence in government and affairs".

Chapter 3 Theory of the ideal human personality in the philosophy of Plato in the theoretical aspects

Plato had never written a dialogue concerning exclusively the question of education. However, as Victor Boutros points out, "few would argue that he was not interested in this subject".[43] In *The Republic* Plato discusses the problem of education,[44] whose theory is divided into theoretical aspect in the first half and practical aspect in the second half. In this chapter, the theoretical aspect of the theory of the ideal human personality is the center of discussion.

Before getting into Plato's theory of the ideal human personality, it is important for us to have some background knowledge of what situation Plato was in and of what problems he intended to solve.

In the history of Greek culture, the period of 4th century was very important. Athens, which was the cultural center of the Hellenic World, experienced the stage of decline because of her defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars (431-404 B.C.E.) (P.II, p.4). The effects of this catastrophe were far more than merely political. "It shook all moral

[43] Victor Boutros, "Spelunking with Socrates: A Study of Socratic Pedagogy in Plato's Republic", p.1 in http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/AnciBout.htm

laws, and it stuck at the roots of religion"(P.II, p.3). The Greeks were aware of the kind of problems they were facing and their task consisted in internal and external reconstruction (P.II, p.4). Externally Athens hoped to regain her political and spiritual leadership in the Hellenic soil while internally she needed to rebuild her moral order. In order to achieve this goal, some philosophers tried to work out solutions for the problem of education. The Greeks thought hard on the relation between the individual and the state. It was because they knew very well if they wanted to rebuild the state, they must start from moral reformation of the individual soul. For this reason, the main concern of the Greeks was the problem of *paideia*: what kind of education can lead to the reformation of the individual soul or, what kind of education is suitable for the reformation of the ideal human personality?

The Republic was conceived in this particular climate of thought. In this masterpiece, the "critical Plato comes to the fore" because Plato considered that the traditional poetry, tragedy, comedy and traditional education were no longer effective.[45] It was because that the common *ethos*------the common good of the state, which alone provided the foundation for the pedagogical and moral significance of

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[44] Cf. *ibid.*, p.1

[45] Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, trans. P.Christopher Smith (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), xi

poetry, was destroyed.[46] In Plato's eyes the sophists[47] were the main contributors to further corruption of the soul and of the state. And they misinterpreted the traditional poetry for the sake of political power.[48] Facing this difficulty, Plato discussed his view comprehensively on social, ethical and educational problems in *The Republic.*[49] "The ultimate interest of Plato's *Republic* is the human soul"(P.II, p.199). That means that Plato's theory of education aims at leading the human soul back to its very nature through attaining the knowledge of reality—the World of the Idea.

The theory of the ideal human personality is closely related to the Platonic theory of Idea. Before getting into Plato's theory of the ideal human personality, some general description of the theory of Idea is needed.

The Greek words *idea* and *eidos* [50] are generally translated as "Idea" or

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[46] *Ibid.*, xi

[47] See the definition of "sophists" in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, online edition. "The term *sophistés* is an agent noun from the Greek verb *sophizesthai*, 'to be skilful (*sophos*). So a *sophistés* originally an expert of every form of wisdom or skill (sophia). The term was thus applied to poets, philosophers and sages of all sorts. But by the late fifth century BC it had received a special application to a new class of men: the professional educators, known to Plato and posterity as the "Sophists".

[48] Cf. Gadamer, *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, xi

[49] *Ibid.*, xi

[50] Cf. Giovanni Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: From Plato to Aristotle*, trans. J.R.Catan (Albany: States University of New York Press, 1990), p.47 According to Reale, the term *idea* and *eidos* are both derived from *idein*, which means "to see". And in the Greek language before Plato it was employed especially to refer to the *visible forms of things;* that is, the exterior form and shape that can be seen with eye, hence the sense 'vision'. But now Plato "speaks of Idea and of the Eidos especially to point out this *interior form*, this *metaphysical structure* or *essence* of the things of nature precisely as *intelligible*".

"Form".[51] In Platonic sense, both *idea* and *eidos* refer to the essence of things, which can only be grasped by "the intellectual sight" —the rational part of the soul (*Symposium* 219A). Upon the objective basis of *Symposium* Giovanni Reale lists out six characteristics of Ideas:

(a) *intelligibility* (an Idea is the quintessential object of the mind or intellect and graspable only by it);
(b) *incorporeal* (an Idea belongs to a realm totally different from the sensible corporeal world);
(c) *being in the full sense* (Ideas are the beings that are really real);
(d) *unchangeable* (Ideas are in devoid of any kind of change besides generation and corruption);
(e) *self-identical* (Ideas are in and of themselves; that is, absolutely objective);
(f) *unities* (Ideas are, each of them, a unity, unifying a multiplicity of things that participate in them).[52]

From the above description, it is clear that the realm of Ideas is totally different from that of things, which are sensible, changeable, beings in a partial sense, subjective, multiplicity in the sensible corporeal world.[53]The focus of Plato's *paideia* exactly points to the realm of Ideas, through which the true personality can be established. The question is: by which method can the human soul reach the realm of Ideas?

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[51] *Ibid.*, p.47 Reale points out that *idea* is an unhappy translation of *idea* and *eidos*, it is because this translation "has taken on meanings that are extraneous to those of Plato." Reale regards that the exact translation of the term would be "Form".
[52] *Ibid.*, p.49.
[53] There is a number of questions concerning with Plato's theory of Ideas. For examples, *idea* is One or Many? What is the relationship between the Sensible World and the Intellectual World? A hundred of answers are given for these inquiries. However, the problems of Plato's theory of Ideas are not the task of this paper, so we are not going to deal with these problems here.

3.1. "Dialogue" and "Dialectic"

As mentioned above, the 4th century was the stage of reconsideration of the problem of *paideia*. Poetry used to play the predominant role in the Greek *paideia* since Homer. But in this epoch, poetry lost its spiritual leadership (P.II, pp.8-9) while its position was replaced by prose (P.II, p.8).[54] This new literary form was the product of this time (P.II, p.8). The great prosaists included Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Demosthenes and Aristotle.

According to Jaeger, these new types of prose literature are the expression of the ideas of some influential schools of philosophy and rhetoric on the problems of politics and ethics (P.II, p.9). Among them, Plato's dialogue is the most famous and important.

What is dialogue? Dialogue, which is a midway between poetry and prose (P.II, p.20), is a new literary form invented by the Socratic circle (P.II, p.18-19).[55] Socrates is regarded as the pioneer of dialogue because he was the first one to employ the method of "question" and "answer" in philosophizing about the human soul (P.II,

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[54] See Jaeger, P. II, pp.8-9 for the reason of the decline of poetry and the rise of prose.

[55] *Ibid.*, pp.18-19 According to Jaeger, as Socrates never wrote down his own thought, thus the chief aim of Plato's dialogue, Xenophon's dialogues and Xenophon's *Memoirs of Socrates* were invented in order to re-create the incomparable personality of their master.

p.19).[56] Later, the Socratic method was taken up and further developed by Plato, and Plato used the name "dialectic" (*dialektikós*) to refer to it.[57]In this sense, dialogue and dialectic are the same.

Why did Socrates use the method of question and answer? Why did Plato describe his master's thought and write his own thought in dialectical form? It was because both Socrates and Plato regarded dialectic the most suitable method of philosophic thought. It was the only way for people to reach a real understanding on any subject (P.II, p.17). As David Fortunoff points out, the practice of dialogue and dialectic is very different from rhetoric, which aims mainly at persuading and fascinating the listeners, winning arguments (*logomachy*) or making the weaker case appear to be the stronger (*philonikia*)[58] and leads to further contribution for the corruption of the soul (*Protagoras* 311b-314c).[59] On the contrary, dialectic aims at "care of the soul" (P.II, p.39) by "questions and answers in order to liberate the soul

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[56] *Ibid.*, p.19 Jaeger writes, "The form of the Platonic dialogues was quite certainly created by a historical fact—the fact that Socrates taught by question and answer." And in Taylor, Hare and Barns, *Greek Philosophers*, (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.148 R.M.Hare also writes, "it was Socrates' practice to ask people who were thought to have knowledge."

[57] Cf. Taylor, Hare and Barns, *Greek Philosophers*, P.154 This point of view is also shared by Richard Robinson, see his *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970, p.90. Also seethe meaning of *dialektikós* in Wang Tzu-sung et al., *Hsi-la che hsueh shih. Vol. 2.*(Pei-ching : Jen min chu pan she :Hsin hua shu tien ching hsiao, 1993) , p.424 The Greek word *dialektikós* , *dia* means *through; let* derived from *lego* which means *say, speak*, so the original meaning of dialektikos is *through speak.*

[58] Cf. David Fortunoff, "Dialogue, Dialectic, and Maieutic: Plato's Dialogues as Educational Models", p.1 in http://www.edu/wcp/Papers/Anci/AnciFort.htm

[59] See also Jaeger P. II, p.35 Jaeger addresses, "The dialectic of Socrates was a perfectly individual and native type of exercise, the extreme opposite to the sophistic educational method which grew up at the same time 〈.....〉 . They taught for money. They gave instruction in special arts or branches of knowledge, and addressed a chosen public—the cultural-hungry sons of the propertied class."

from errors and to dispose it towards the truth".[60] Giovanni Reale says:

> The soul, the individual soul, is cared only through dialogue or dialectic, that is the conservation through or with the logos which proceeds by question and answer, actively involving both the teacher and the student in a single spiritual experience, the mutual search for the truth. The open dialogue corresponds more closely to the most profound needs of those who inquire together. It thus places them in a relationship so to speak, soul to soul.[61]

It is apparent that in many cases Plato's dialogues end without answers. For example, the subject matter of *Greater Hippias* is the definition of "the absolute beautiful". It is clear that "what is the absolute beautiful" is an ontological inquiry because Socrates is asking "what is the idea of beautiful". He refuses to accept that "the beautiful maid", "gold", "the appropriate" and "the useful" are identical to "the absolute beautiful" because they are just the examples of "the absolute beautiful" rather than the answers. But at the end of the dialogue Socrates does not give us any answer concerning "the idea of beautiful", and the question left unanswered. In this way Socrates' questioning seems ridiculous. R.M.Hare proposes some possible challenges to Socrates' method of teaching:

> For instance, we all know how to pick out examples of courage ("courage" is the subject matter of *Lache*), but many of us find it hard to define this word. If Socrates asks us what courage is, and we cannot provide an answer which satisfies his rigorous standards, we may come to think that we don't know what it is, or wonder whether the acts we thought had it in fact had it, or even whether

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[60] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: From the Origins to Socrates*, p.240
[61] *Ibid.*, p.239

there is such a thing; and this may be bad for our moral characters. Socrates therefore really is 'corrupting the young'.[62]

Generally speaking, "answer" is regarded as more important than "question". From Hare's article we notice that the general criticism on Plato's dialogues is that Socrates and Plato only hammer the answers of their interlocutors into pieces, but they provide no answer for their inquiries after all. In this sense it is not the sophists who, always providing us with answers, corrupt the young through sophistry; it is indeed Socrates and Plato who, giving no answers, corrupt our minds through dialectic. And Michael Meyer questions the value of the Platonic dialectical way of teaching with the support of J.S.C.Evans' doubt: To what extent can intellectual advance be achieved by the method of question and answer?[63]

According to Gadamer, however, the above criticisms are inappropriate. Gadamer, who stresses the importance of "question" rather than "answer", holds that Socrates' questioning neither aims at giving his own opinion as an answer for the sake of asserting himself in front of the audience as the sophists do; nor does he try to make fool of his interlocutors. [64] The main purpose of Socrates' questioning is to

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[62] Taylor, Hare and Barns, *Greek Philosophers*, p.150,
[63] Michael Meyer, "Dialectic And Questioning", in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol.17, November 4, October, 1980, p.281
[64] *Ibid*, p.281-282

examine our opinions, which we hold to be true, unchallengeable and unquestionable. The most important thing is that dialectic emphasizes on making us "know thyself" (*Charmides* 164d)[65]------ making us to be aware of our finitude and limitedness and urges us to make further inquiry.[66] So, the way of truth always starts with this "knowledge of not knowing".

Besides, although the opinions of the interlocutors are usually being hammered down in Plato's dialogues, their knowledge of the object (idea) is strengthened rather than weakened during the process of dialectic. In the case of "the absolute beautiful" in *Greater Hippias*, Socrates refuses to accept that "the beautiful maid", "gold", "the appropriate" and "the useful" are the answers to "the absolute beautiful", but these examples do clarify our knowledge of the idea of the beautiful. According to Jaeger, the dialectic way of enquiry aims at discovering the One (idea) underlying the Many (P.II, p.103). Jaeger says:

> The doctor takes a number of different cases, which have the same fundamental character, and reduces them to one form of illness, one eidos. The dialectician does the same in investigating an ethical question—for instance in exploring the nature of courage (in *Laches*). He takes a number of different cases, which we call courage, and tries to reduce them into a unity (P.II, p.103).

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[65] See *Charmides* in Plato, *Plato XII*, trans. W.R.M.Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1986)
[66] Cf. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p.362

Socratic and Platonic dialectic aims at philosophizing the human soul. But, what is the Platonic concept of the soul? What is the relationship between the concept of soul and the concept of ideal personality?

3.2. Plato's concept of the soul

As mentioned before, the Greeks were fully aware that moral reformation in the individual soul was the first step to rebuild their state. Hence the individual soul—*psyche* was the object of education and it became one of the fundamental concepts in Platonic *paideia.*

What is the relationship between the concept of the ideal personality and the concept of the soul? As frequently mentioned in the previous part, the aim of education is to build up the ideal personality and, in Plato's sense, the meaning of the ideal personality is nothing other than the perfect harmony of all parts of the soul, which we shall discuss in detail in this chapter (P.II, p.320). In other words, the goal of education is to harmonize the soul because the "building up the ideal personality" and "harmonizing the soul" indeed have the same meaning.

What is the Platonic concept of the soul? John Burnet in his fine essay "The

Socrates Doctrine of the Soul"[67] tells us that "neither the Homeric and epic *eidolon*, the shade in Hades, nor the air-soul of the Ionic philosophers, nor the soul-daemon of the Orphic belief, nor the *psyché* of the Attic tragedy can really explain the new meaning given to the word by Socrates"(P.II, p.41). But no one will deny that the pre-Socratic philosophical thought of the soul does provide the background for Plato's concept of the soul.

The concept of *psyche* began to develop in the 6th century and its origin can be traced back to Homer. [68] Jaeger suggests two meanings in this classical usage. In some cases Homer applies the word *psyche* in connexion with the living person, in the sense of life---the animal life in his epic (TEGP, p.74). It is the primary meaning of Homeric *psyche*. On the other hand, *psyche* is also used as the shadow of the dead person in the Hades in a number of Homeric passages. As soon as a man dies, his existence as an individual ceases (TEGP, p.74) and his "personal identity" (the individual body) does not exist anymore after death, and the meaning of *psyche* in this case is secondary and derivative (TEGP, P.74). According to Jaeger, neither the Homeric *psyche* in the primary nor in the secondary sense means the concept of

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[67] Quoted by Jaeger in P.II, p.376 n. 69

[68] Cf. Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of The Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1960), p.73 In this thesis *The Theology of The Early Greek Philosophers* will be replaced by its abbreviation TEGP

personal identity. Erwin Rohde, however, holds a different point of view. He begins with the fact that the Homeric *psyche* is an image of the living man.[69] In this sense, *psyche* does imply personal identity. But Jaeger points out that Homer sometimes uses the expression "the man himself" in contrast to the shadow. Indeed he is thinking of the body as such, even if there is no life in it. In *The Iliad* (1.1-6):

> Rage—Goddess, sing the rage of Peleus' son Achilles,
> murderous, doomed, that cost the Achaeans countless losses,
> hurling down to the House of Death so many sturdy souls,
> great fighters' souls, but made their bodies carrion,
> feasts for the dogs and birds,
> and the will of Zeus was moving towards its end.

In the Homeric sense, there is no soul in a man which can live on after death. According to Rohde, before the *psyche* has flown away from the body, it must have dwelt for a while in the living person and its activity is what we call "consciousness" (TEGP, P.74).[70] So, in Rohde's view it is reasonable to say that "consciousness" and the Homeric *psyche* have the same meaning. But Jaeger disagrees with Rohde. He

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[69] Cf. E.Rohde, *Psyche* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), p.6. Rohde says, "If we now ask—as our Homer psychologists generally do--which, in the face of this mysterious association between a living body and its counterfeit the psyche, is the real man, we find that Homer in fact gives contradictory answers. Not infrequently (in the first lines of *the Iliad*) the material body is contrasted as the 'man himself', with the psyche—which cannot therefore be any organ or component part of the living body. On the other hand, that which takes, its departure at death and hastens into the realm of Hades is also referred to by the proper name of the person as 'himself'—which means that here the shadowy psyche (for nothing else can go down to Hades) is invested with the name and value of the complete personality, the 'self' of the man". From this paragraph it shows that in Homeric sense, both of the material body and psyche can be described as the man's self, but about how can it be, Jaeger regards that it is a problem unsolved.

[70] See also Rohde, *Psyche*, p.5

says that shadows of dead persons, which have entered Hades, enjoy no conscious existence there. Only the Greeks after Homer used the concept *psyche* to denote both the "soul" and "consciousness". In the Homeric epoch, the concept of "consciousness" is called *thumos* [71] (TEGP, p.74). "Consciousness" and "life" were never originally conceived as a unity because they were represented by two different words---*thumos* and *psyche* respectively (TEGP, p.81).

In Jaeger's point of view, Homer used the word *psyche* to indicate both "life" in a primary sense and "shadow in the Hade" in a secondary sense; but none of them implies the concept of personal identity. It is because the concept of the personal identity refers to the physical body only. We have mentioned before that the great hero Achilles is said to be the ideal personality, if it is the case the implication of "ideal personality" refers to Achilles' body only, not his soul. Hence in Homeric epoch the concept of the soul, the concept of ideal personality and education were not closely related to one another.

Besides Homer, Pindar's thought on the soul also prepares for Plato's concept of the soul. In Pindar's poetry:

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[71] Cf. *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek, thumos*, online edition. *Thumos* can be defined as: soul, spirit, the principle of life, mind, thought and feeling especially of strong feeling and passion.

And all men's bodies follow the call
Of overpowering death.
And yet there still will longer behind
A living image of life,
For this alone has come from the gods.
Its sleep while the members re active;
But to those who sleep themselves
It reveals in myriad visions
The fateful approach
Of adversities or delights.[72]

From this poetry Pindar's account of *psyche* has the following characteristics: (1) it is the only thing that remains after the body's death; (2) it is divine in nature as it comes from god; (3) it is the image of the living person. The last point is the most important according to Rhode. It is because Pindar thought that the image of the living person is present in him even during his lifetime.[73] This point of view is in sharp contrast with the Homeric (or Jaeger's understanding of Homeric soul) because Pindar's *psyche* is a living image of life. When the body undergoes death, the image of the living person remains alive (TEGP, p.78). The concept of personal identity now is related to both "living person" and "shade in Hade".

Later, Anaximenes in one of his remaining fragments gave his account of the concept of soul:

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[72] Quoted by Jaeger in TEGP, p.75
[73] Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, p.7

> Just as our psyche, which is air, holds us together and rules us 〈 ..... 〉 so do *pneuma* and air encompass the whole cosmos.[74]

Anaximenes' concept of *psyche* is richer than "life" and "shade of Hade". He thinks that "Air" is the bearer of life and it is the boundless substance that underlies all Becoming (TEGP, p.79). That is why *psyche* in other words means "breath" because it belongs to the same family as *psycho,* which means "to breath" (TEGP, p.82). Does *psyche* in Anaximenes' sense also indicate "the idea of consciousness" (TEGP, p.80)? According to Anaximenes, since *psyche* is the first principle of man, it is reasonable to say that *psyche* is the source of our intellectual power (TEGP, p.80). So, Anaximenes' concept of *psyche* implies the meaning of *thumos*. In short, "*psyche* entirely absorbed the meaning of *thumos* as soul or mind" (TEGP, p.83).

According to Jaeger, "the complete coalescence of life-soul and consciousness-soul appeared in the religious beliefs of the 6th century Orphics and Pythagoreans as a presupposition of their famous doctrine of the so-called transmigration of souls" (TEGP, p.83). Reale says, "Pythagoras is certainly the first philosopher who taught the doctrine of metempsychosis------the doctrine according to which the soul is constrained to be reincarnated many times in successive bodies, not

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[74] Quoted by Jaeger in Jaeger, TEGP, p.79

only limits to the form of human being, but likewise in the different forms of animals as well"[75]. In this epoch, the most important theory of the soul was Pythagoras' doctrine of the "transmigration of the soul". According to this doctrine, "death" is nothing other than the return of the individual to the original form and his entry into new forms (TEGP, p.85). This feature of the transmigration theory is very important because it denotes the preservation of the identity of a person both before and after this life (TEGP, p.85). In this theory, the permanence of the person as an intellectually and morally responsible agent co-operating in is own fate is guaranteed (TEGP, p.85).

In Pythagorean doctrine the soul is immortal; it pre-exists the body and its existence goes on after the body.[76] The soul is divine by its nature and everlasting. The nature of the body, however, is corruptible and mortal. The union of soul and body is the punishment for an original fault committed by the soul.[77] Body (*soma*) indeed is the "prison" (*sema*) for soul.[78] Man should not live in the body, but should live a life for the soul. The only way for the soul to be liberated from the circle of transmigration is to purify the soul by philosophy. This means, "cleaning up those

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[75] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy I: From the Origins to Socrates*, p.67

[76] Cf. Gadamer, *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, p.26. See also *Phaedo* 77a-c in Plato, *Plato I*, trans. H,N,Flower (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1995)

[77] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy I: From the Origins to Socrates*, p.67

[78] See *Cratylus* (400b-c) in Plato, *Plato* IV, trans. H.N.Flower (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996). According to Plato, the Greek words *soma* (it has the both meanings of "body" and "safe") and *sema* (prison) have the similar meanings.

connections to the body which it has contracted because of its original fault", which becomes the task of education.[79]

According to Jaeger, there is a slight difference between Socrates' thought of the soul and Plato's. And he illustrates the Socrates' concept of soul by *Memoirs of Socrates* of Xenophon:

> Socrates: Do you believe that you have something intelligence?
> Aristodemus: Go on asking questions and you will get your answer!
> Socrates: Do you suppose that there is nothing intelligent anywhere else, knowing as you do that what you have in your body is only a small portion of all the earth there is, and only a little water out of a vast volume of it, and that your share of each of the other elements of which your body is composed is minute in proportion to the whole? Do you really believe that by some lucky chance you have appropriated mind for yourself, and that is alone exists nowhere else, and that the orderliness of these vast masses of infinite multitude is due, as you say, to a kind of unintelligence?
> Aristodemus: Yes, to be sure, for I can't see who controls them as I can see that the processes of manufacture that go on around us are controlled by the craftsmen.
> Socrates: You can't see your own mind either, although it controls your body. On that principle, you can say that you do nothing by design and everything by chance. (1.4.4-1.4.11)[80]

In this dialogue, Socrates' attitude to the human nature is: body, like the soul, is a part of the universe (P.II, p.44). "Body" and "soul" indeed represent the different sides of

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[79] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy I: From the Origins to Socrates*, p.67
[80] Xenophon, Robin Waterfield ed., *Conservations of Socrates*, trans. Hugh Tredennick and Robin Waterfield (Marmondsworth Middlesex in England, Penguin Classics printed by Clays Ltd, St Lves plc, 1990)

one human nature. In this way, the Socratic view is contrary to that of Pythagoras because Socrates never regards the psychical man (soul) and physical man (body) as opposing to each other (P.II, p.43).

However, the soul, which is an intellectual faculty and the source of our thinking activity and our ethical activity,[81] is ranked higher than the body. The soul is the highest interest of man. In Platonic dialogues, Socrates emphasizes the importance of "know thyself" and "take care of your soul". Reale points out:

> To know "your self" does not mean to know your own name, nor your own body, but rather to examine interiorly and to know your own soul, just as to care for your own self does not mean to care for your body but your soul.[82]

Plato's arguments of immorality of the soul are dominant in *Meno* and *Phaedo*.[83] In these arguments, soul, which is the essence of human being, is an independent substance from the body. The theory of immortality of the soul, however, is unknown to Socrates. Rohde says, Socrates "shows little anticipation of an immortal life".[84] For this reason, Jaeger believes that these arguments are Plato's origin and he put

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[81] Cf. Realle, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: From the Origins to Socrates*, p.202
[82] *Ibid.*, p.203
[83] For example, in *Phaedo* (64c) Plato writes, "We believe, do we mot, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the state of bring dead is the state in which the body id separated from the soul and exists alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself? Is death anything other than this?" See *Phaedo* in Plato, *Plato II*, trans. W.R.M.Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990)
[84] See Rohde, *Psyche*, p.463

them into the mouth of Socrates (P.II, p.42). This judgment can be proved in *Apology*. Scholars such as H.N.Fowler,[85] W.K.C.Guthrie [86]and Jaeger (P.II, p.42), regard *Apology* as the speech delivered by Socrates himself. So we may obtain a clearer understanding of Socrates' view of immorality of the soul from it:

> For the state of death is one of two things: either it is virtually nothingness, so that the dead has no consciousness of anything, or it is, as people say, a change and migration of the soul from this to another place (40c-d).[87]

Death in the former case has nothing to do with the "immorality of soul"; in the later it seems to imply that the soul sustains after leaving the body, but Socrates leaves it doubtful of its immorality (P.II, p.42).

What is Plato's concept of human nature? In *Phaedo* he says:

> "Now," said he, "shall we assume two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible?"
> "Let us assume them," said Cebes.
> "And that the invisible is always the same and the visible constantly changing?"
> "Let us assume that also," said he.
> "Well then," said Socrates, "are we not made up of two parts, body and soul?" (79a-b)

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[85] Cf. Plato, *Plato I*, trans. H,N,Flower (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1995), p.64
[86] Cf. W.K.C.Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* vol.III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp.477-476
[87] See *Apology* in Plato, *Plato I*, trans. H,N,Flower (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University

Plato shares the same point of view with his master because Plato holds also that "man" is made up of two kinds of existence: soul and body. The soul, which is pure spiritual essence, is immaterial, invisible and changeless. The body, on the contrary, is material essence, visible and changeable. And Plato goes further in his enquiry:

> "Consider the matter in another way. When the soul and body are joined together, nature directs the one to serve and be ruled, and the other to rule and be master. Now this being the case, which seems to you like the divine, and which like the mortal? Or do you like the divine is by nature fitted to rule and lead, and the mortal to obey and serve?"
> "Yes, I think so."
> "Which, them does the soul resemble?"
> "Clearly, Socrates, the soul is like the divine and the body like the mortal."(80a)

The soul is not one of the Ideas, but it has "its essential attributes *life* and *the Idea of life:* it is, in fact that which brings life to the body and maintains it".[88] Body, on the contrary, does not contain the essence of life. It is the soul that brings life to the body. For this reason, the soul is the master of the body and the body should be ruled.

Moreover in *Phaedrus* (245c-246a)[89] Plato says that the soul is the source of all movements, including the movement of the body. Without the soul, there would be no

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Press, 1995)
[88] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.143
[89] See *Phaedrus* in Plato, *Plato I*, trans. H,N,Flower (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995)

movement in the world and no life either.[90] But the soul itself never ceases to move. Soul has nothing to do with death because it is immortal. [91] When death happens, the soul departs from the body and continues to exist. The soul comes closer to the divine. On the contrary, the body cannot last long because it is mortal. It will perish while death arrives. Hence it is akin to the mortal. Plato tells us more about his view on soul and body in *Phaedo*:

> But when the soul inquiries alone by itself, it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same the unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom. Is it not so? (79d)

The soul reveals itself to the intellectual capacity to man, not merely the capacity to abstract the unsubstantial general concept from the multiplicity of experience,[92] but it gives man the highest capacity—"wisdom", to reach the everlasting and changeless reality --Ideas in the World of Idea. The body, however, reveals its perceptual capacity to man. The body perceives only the multiplicity of the changing experience of the material essence------things in the World of Sensibility.

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[90] Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, p.466
[91] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.143
[92] Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, p.465

In Plato's eyes, the pure spiritual, immortal, intellectual, moral and self-aware soul is the "highest interest of man" (P.II, p.39), as Pythagorean and Socrates suggested. So Vogel says, "the most precious thing we have is our own soul, for it is the most divine and most properly our own".[93]

On the relationship between the soul and the body, Rhode has a somewhat different opinion. He says that the soul and the body are closely bound up together, but there is a great gulf between them because their natures contradict totally, or are even incompatible with each other.[94] For example, the soul is divine and immortal in nature while the body is mortal in nature. And in *Phaedo* Plato writes:

> There seems to be a short cut which leads us and our argument to the conclusion in our search that so long as we have the body, and the soul is contaminated by such an evil, we shall never attain completely what we desire, that is, the truth. For the body keeps us constantly busy by reason of its need of substance; and moreover, if diseases and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles; for all wars arise for the sake of gaining money, and we are compelled to gain money for the sake of the body. We are slaves to its services (66b-c).

From the above dialogue, Reale points out that "the body is the root of all evil and the sources of unhealthful desires, passions, hatreds, discords, ignorance, and folly: all

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[93] See C.J.de Vogel, *Rethinking Plato and Platonism* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1988), p.173
[94] Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, p.466

this mortifies the soul".[95] For this reason, the body is an obstacle for the soul to pursuit the pure knowledge. In *Phaedo* Plato says:

> And then, as our argument shows, when we are dead and claim to be enamoured of, but not while we live. For, if pure knowledge is impossible while the body is with us, one of two things must follow, either it cannot be acquired at all or only when we are dead; for then the soul will be by itself apart from the body, not before (66d-67a).

According to the above dialogue, body and soul seem to be incompatible with each other. The body is an obstacle for the soul to pursuit truth. Truth can be acquired only if the soul leaves the body. Plato says "the true philosophers and they alone are always most eager to release the soul, and just this—the release and separation of the soul from the body"(67d). For this reason, Plato suggests that those who want to pursuit truth should practice death because death is nothing other than releasing the soul from the body It seems that Plato's attitude to the body is totally negative. But, is it really the case?

As mentioned before, in Plato's view a man is made up of both his body and soul, which are regarded as two kinds of existence. In this sense, although Plato holds that the soul is the highest interest of man, he never depreciates the body because it is a

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[95] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.157

part of human being. Besides, the body and the bodily desires are not the source of evil if the body is under the rule of the soul and the bodily desire is not excessive. Plato says:

> And while we live, we shall, I think, be nearest to knowledge when we avoid, so far as possible, intercourse and communion with the body, except what is necessary, and are not filled with its nature, but keep ourselves pure from it until God himself sets us free (67a).

Plato says that "death" is the only way to pursuit truth. His meaning, however, is not that we should commit suicide for the sake of truth. What Plato really means is that the soul should not be the slave of the body for the sake of unlimited satisfaction of bodily desires, and the soul should make use of the body to serve its purpose—reaching the Idea of the Good. In this sense, the body does have its function on the way to truth because this way has to start with the body. We will discuss it in detail later.

On the other hand, Plato mentions in *The Republic* (436a-444d)[96] that the soul is divided into three parts with different functions. "Reason" or "Intellect" (*logistikon*) is the part by which we achieve the knowledge of ideas; a second, "spirit" (*thymoeides*)

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[96] See *The Republic* in Plato, *Plato V & VI*, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994)

corresponds to the drives and emotions;[97] and finally "desire" (*epithymetikon*) is the part most closely related to the needs of the body.[98] In *Phaedrus* Plato makes the same suggestion through an analogy, in which reason is represented by a charioteer while spirit and desire two horses (246a-247c). And among these three parts, reason is the most valuable, spirit comes next and the desire is the less valuable. If it is the case, we may say that desire is already part of the soul. For this reason, we should not blame that the body is the only source of harm. Is it reasonable to say so? In *Phaedo* Plato says:

> Then see, Cebes, if this is not the conclusion from all that we have said, that the soul is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging, and the body, on the contrary, most like the human and mortal and multiform and unintellectual and dissoluble and ever changing. Can we say anything, my dear Cebes, to show that this is not so?(80b)

From the above dialogue, it is evident that Plato never considers the soul as a composite thing, but a single being.[99] The two horses, as Fowler suggests, "represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body".[100] Plato writes:

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[97] Cf. Julian Marias, *History of Philosophy*, trans. S.Appelbaum and C.C.Strowbridge (New York: Dover Publication, 1967), p.55
[98] *Ibid.*, p.55
[99] See Plato, *Plato I*, trans. Flower, p.409
[100] *Ibid.*, p.409

"The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion very distinct and very true; but it is not. These objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?"

"Certainly."

"And when this occurs, is not the soul most completely put in bondage by the body?"

" How so?"

"Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and rivets it on and makes it corporeal, so that it fancies the things are true which the body says are true. For because it has the same beliefs and pleasures as the body it is compelled to adopt also the same habits and mode of life, and can never depart in purity to the other world, but must always go away contaminated with the body; and so it sinks quickly into another body again and grows into it, like seed that is sown. Therefore it has no part in the communion with the divine and pure and absolute."(*Phaedrus* 83c-e)

As Rohde says, "the soul by its very nature is divine, absolute and pure capacity of thought and knowledge".[101] And the soul, "to which the feeling, emotion and desire are added outside, they do not belong to imperishable nature of the soul".[102] The spirit and the desire are the modes of the soul only if the soul comes into contact with the body. For this reason, the above argument that the soul is the source of harm is inappropriate.

A life in which the soul is a slave of the body is not worth living. It is because the body always directs us to the changing and the untrue. The soul is confused and

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[101] Rohde, *Psyche*, p.467

[102] *Ibid.*, p.467

ceases to be divine (*Phaedo* 79c) and the ideal personality cannot be built up. So, the task of Plato's *paideia* includes two main points: (i) that reason rules over spirit and desire; (ii) that human soul rules over body. Only under these conditions can the ideal personality be built up.

3.3. Plato's concept of *areté*

In Chapter Two we have mentioned that *areté* is important for establishing the ideal personality. Plato, like his predecessors, also holds that *areté* is essential to our soul. Without *areté* human nature cannot attain perfection and the establishment of the ideal human personality is not possible. What is Plato's concept of *areté*?

"Justice" (*dikaiosyne*), "prudence" (*sophrosyne*), "piety" (*anosion*) and "courage" (*andreia*) are "the Platonic cardinal virtues"(P.II, pp.61-62). Plato deals with these four fundamental virtues in his dialogues respectively. In *The Republic* the investigation of the concept of "justice" is the main task leading the whole discussion; in *Charmides* "prudence" is the subject matter; in *Euthypro* "piety" while in *Lache* "courage". Plato, however, ends all his discussions without a final definition of the four virtues, as he usually does in his dialogues (P.II, p.282). As Jaeger's task in his work is not to investigate the natures of justice, prudence, piety and courage, so some

background knowledge on these four cannons would be helpful to our discussion.

"Courage" is the *areté par excellence* in Homeric epic. In Homeric eyes "courage" means mainly physical *areté* because courage refers mainly to the bodily strengths during the war. In Plato's philosophy, although "courage" is still an *areté* related to war, it is an intellectual *areté* rather than a physical one. "Courage", as Plato tells us in *Protagoras* (360a-d), is the ability of preserving the correct opinion in case of dealing with dangerous affairs in the war, "without allowing the victory to be carried by pleasures or pains or fears or passions".[103]

What is piety? According to Jaeger, "piety" is a classical political idea (P.II, p.95). In *Euthypro* Plato ends his discussion without giving us the exact definition of "piety". According to this dialogue, we may conclude that piety means "paying the proper honor to the gods of the state, who preserved the laws and institutions of the state." (P.II, p.95)

What is "prudence"? A.E.Taylor points out that there are several definitions concerning the Greek concept of "prudence".[104] In Plato's sense prudence "is a kind

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[103] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.194

[104] Cf. A.E.Taylor, *Plato: The Man and his Work* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd.1977), p.48 According

of beautiful order and a continence of certain pleasures and appetites" (*The Republic* 430e). It means that a man can be regarded as a prudent man only if reason rules over desire in his soul. Hence he really becomes "master of himself"(430e).

"What is justice?" is the leading question of *The Republic*. Among the four fundamental virtues, "justice" is the most important one because it is the foundation of all virtues. For this reason, it is correct to regard justice as *areté par excellence*. "Justice" is a very fundamental principle on which the ideal human personality can be established. In fact the whole discussion on Plato's *paideia* is derived from it. The Platonic sense of "justice" is different from the traditional and the popular usage in his epoch. Platonic justice neither means "acting according to the external law" as Hesiod did nor paying debts as those popular views hold in *The Republic* (331b-d).[105] According to Plato, reason, spirit and desire represent three different modes of the soul. Among these three parts, reason should rule while spirit and desire be ruled. Reason sets limit to desire of what should be and what should not be desired. Spirit should control desire and support reason (440a-441b). Both desire and spirit can function properly only if they are under the rule of reason. The meaning of justice is

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to Taylor, *sophrosyne* can be defined as: (a) the possession of a sane, wholeness or soundness mind; (b) the kind of conduct thought becoming specially in the young towards elders, soldiers towards their superior officer, citizens towards their magistrates; (c) the characteristic of the man who knows how to hold his imperious bodily appetites, and this definition correspond with Platonic sense of "prudence". See also the definition of *sophrosyne* in *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, online edition.

that each part within the soul does its own work in the matter of ruling and being ruled (443b). "A man must not suffer the principles (reason, courage and desire) in his soul to do each work of some other and interfere and meddle with one another"(443d).

Justice is the quality of the soul, through which each man is able to attain "self-mastery and beautiful order within himself, and having harmonized" (443d-e). Justice, which is man's harmonious agreement with the inner law within his soul, is the ground of the harmonious completeness of personality (P.II, p.241). In Plato's sense justice is not the external law that we must act according to it in order to avoid the punishment of god. And justice is not a means for the stronger to take the advantage of the weaker, as Glaucon and Adeimantus state in *The Republic* (338e-339b). The most important is that justice is "good in itself" for the soul (357b-c). Man pursuits justice because it is an essential condition for his ideal personality----the harmonious completeness of the soul.

Plato in *Meno* reminds us that "justice", "prudence", " piety" and "courage" are essential and are profitable to the soul only if they are guided by wisdom, otherwise they are harmful and are not worthy of the name "virtue", which is always good

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[105] See also *The Republic* 331e-336a, 336b-354c

(*Meno* 88a-d)[106]. Plato says:

> If then virtue is an attribute of the spirit, and one which cannot fail to be beneficial, it must be wisdom; for all spiritual qualities in and by themselves are neither advantageous nor harmful, but become advantageous or harmful by the presence with them ----------of wisdom or folly If we accept this argument, then virtue, to be something advantageous, must be a sort of wisdom (88c-d).

Only if "justice", "prudence", " piety" and "courage" are guided by "wisdom", but not desire or spirit in our soul, are they really advantageous to the soul (88c-d). Hence "virtue" must be a sort of wisdom.

"Justice", "prudence", " piety" and "courage" are the Platonic cardinal virtues. To the Platonic concept of virtue, however, Protagoras used to challenge:

> You said that Zeus had sent justice and respect to mankind, and furthermore it was frequently stated in your discourse that justice, temperance, holiness and the rest were all but one single thing, virtue: pray, now proceed to deal with these in more precise exposition, stating whether virtue is a single thing, of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts, or whether the qualities I have just mentioned are all names of the same thing. This is what I am still hankering after (*Protagoras* 329 c-d)[107].

What are the relationships between "justice", "prudence", "piety" and "courage"? Are

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[106] See *Meno* in Plato, *Plato* II, trans. W.R.M.Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991)

[107] See *Protagoras* in Plato, *Plato* II, trans. W.R.M.Lamb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991)

they the same or different in nature? If they are different, are they qualitatively different or quantitatively different? Actually, in *Protagoras* and in the earlier dialogues Plato has never clearly shown us the relation between "whole" and "part" through the concept of virtue (P.II, p.117). According to Plato, "justice", "prudence", "piety" and "courage" are essentially the same because they share the common element------"virtue in itself" and they are naturally "knowledge" (*episteme*). Plato furthers his discussion on virtue in *Protagoras*:

> Well then, I continued, when men partake of these portions of virtue, do some have one, and some another, or if you get one, must you have them all (329e)?

From Plato's point of view, when a man possesses virtue, he must possess virtue with all its parts. This is saying if he is a just man, at the same time he must be brave, wise and holy. A virtuous man cannot have one part of virtue without the others. Plato cannot imagine that "one man is brave but unjust; one is just but no wise", as Protagoras holds (329e). It is because virtue by its very nature is one and indivisible (P.II, p.67). For this reason, the Platonic sense of virtue is a revolutionary one. It is because "virtue" in the traditional sense is "a mere aggregate of the products of various one-sided types of training—one whose elements stand in irreconcilable ethical contradiction to one another" (P.II, p.67). In the Platonic concept of virtue,

"justice", "prudence", " piety" and "courage" are all in one person.

As mentioned before, virtue is the essential knowledge to the ideal human personality. Acting according to reason is the only guide to the harmonious completeness of the soul. So Plato thinks that "reason" and "knowledge" are "the highest human powers"(P.II, p.118). But in reality, as pointed out in *Protagoras*, many people choose desire rather than reason as their guide of life even though it is wrong to do so (352d-353a). Protagoras' challenge is that there is a long way between "knowing good" and "doing good" because there is no necessary connection between them (P.II, p.119). A big difficulty that Plato has to face is: if a man learns what is good and what is bad, can knowledge really be helpful to him to act rightly on the one side and stop him from wrongdoings on the other (352c)? In *Protagoras* Plato says:

> For you agreed with us that those who make mistakes with regard to the choice of pleasure and pain, in otherwise words, with regard to good and man, do so because of a lack of knowledge you agreed was measurement. And the mistaken act done without knowledge you must know is one done from ignorance. (357d-e)

To Plato, most people treat desire rather than reason as their guide of actions and the fact that they do wrong rather than right is mainly due to the lack of knowledge. Plato puts forward his discussion:

> I am pretty sure that none of the wise men thinks that any human being willingly makes a mistake or willingly does anything wrong or bad. They know very well that anyone who does anything wrong or bad does so involuntarily (345e).

In *Meno* Plato states also this view:

> "There are some who think the evil benefits him who gets it, or does he knows that it harms him who has it?
> "There are some who think the evil is a benefit, and others who know that it does harm."
> "And, in your opinion, do those who think the evil a benefit know that it is evil?"
> "I do not think that at all."
> "Obviously those who are ignorant of the evil do not desire it, but only what they supposed to be good, though it is really evil; so that those who are ignorant of it and think it good are really desiring the good. Is not that so?" (77d-e)

If a man possesses knowledge, he can make a right judgment in distinguishing good from bad as well as right from wrong. For this reason, he always does good but not bad, right but not wrong. Plato stresses that "knowing good" and "doing good" indeed are the same. On the contrary, if a man does not possess knowledge, then he is ignorant. Hence he will properly make a wrong judgment of good and bad, right and wrong. It is because he is "supposing", but not "knowing" what good is and what bad is. The result is wrongdoing. Plato emphasizes, "nobody errs willingly" (*Protagoras* 345d). All wrongdoing is involuntary because of ignorance.

Knowledge is important to the ideal personality. Can knowledge be taught? Is

education possible?

3.4. Can knowledge be taught? Is education possible?

How can man acquire knowledge? Can it be taught? Or is it obtained through practice, not teaching? Or if neither by practice nor by learning, does it come to mankind by nature or in some other ways (*Meno* 70a)? The problem of knowledge, as we have mentioned in Chapter Two, was the main concern of pre-Platonic philosophers.[108] Reale says that none of them formulated the problem of knowledge in any detailed, precise, exact and definite way.[109] And "Plato is the first to frame it clearly".[110] He tries really hard to provide a solution in his writings. *Meno* is Plato's first work that deals with this problem specifically.

In *Meno* the first problem that Plato has to tackle is whether or not knowledge can be taught. Plato's answer is that "virtue cannot be taught". Jaeger stresses that Plato rejects several times the word "teach" (*didaskein*) because it "seems to imply filling the soul with knowledge poured in from outside" (P.II, p.169).[111] It is no doubt that the sophists, who consider themselves as teaching all sorts of knowledge, are the

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[108] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.117
[109] *Ibid.*, p.117
[110] *Ibid.*, p.117
[111] See also *Meno* 84c, 84d, 85d, 85e

main figures of Plato's denunciation. Plato has no question on the obvious success of the sophists in intellectual culture, but he wonders whether the sophists' teaching can really impart virtue (P.II, p.114). In *Protagoras* (318d-319d), Plato emphasizes that "knowledge" is not the same case of "an affair of building" or "laying down a ship", which can be taught by the builder or shipwright. It is because "building" and "laying down a ship" belong to the field of *techné.* In fact Plato has strictly distinguished two concepts, namely, "knowledge" (*episteme*) and "skill' (*techné*). In other words, Paul Wooddruff thinks that in Plato's sense there are two sorts of knowledge. One sort of knowledge, which Plato calls "knowledge", is "non-expert knowledge", so it cannot be taught. The other, which is called "skill", is "expert-knowledge", so it can be transmitted from man to man and can be obtained through training.[112]

On the other hand, Plato denies that "knowledge can be taught" with the support of Pericles' example. The great Athenian—Pericles, who was wise and great, brought up his two sons and had them taught riding, music, athletics, and all other kinds of skill until they were as good as anyone in Athens. Pericles intended also to make his sons as good as him. However, he could not achieve his goal because "making people to be good and virtuous" was something that could not be taught (*Meno* 94b). The

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[112] Cf. Paul Woodruff, "Plato's Early Theory of Knowledge" in Hugh H. Benson ed., *Essay On The Philosophy of Socrates*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.90

knowledge of caring human soul cannot be taught. It is because neither the teacher nor the student of virtue can be found (96b-c).

Plato objects that knowledge can be obtained through teaching and learning. Can it be obtained through practicing? To Plato, knowledge cannot be acquired through practicing. It is because any virtuous practice is based on "knowledge". Only if we possess knowledge is virtuous practice possible (97b-c). For this reason, knowledge cannot be achieved through practicing. On the contrary, knowledge is the necessary condition for any virtuous practice. In this case, "knowledge" is a cause; "virtuous practice" is an effect.

Neither can knowledge be obtained through learning, nor can it be acquired through practicing. Does knowledge come to mankind by nature? Plato rejects this view immediately. As mentioned before, "justice", "prudence", " piety" and "courage" can benefit the soul only if they are guided by "wisdom". They can be harmful otherwise. In this sense, a good man is not good by nature. Only are the spiritual elements (justice, prudence, piety and courage) guided by "wisdom" that they will bring good to his soul. It is obvious that knowledge does not come to mankind by nature (88d-89a). Plato adds one more point: if knowledge come to man

by nature, it would be recognized by the experts at an early stage. The experts would protect the good man by taking them away from corruption until they were mature and useful to the state (89b). Since no such kind of thing happened, Plato concludes that *areté* does not come to man by nature.

Plato rejects several possible ways of achieving knowledge. How does man acquire *areté*? Where did the virtuous men such as Pericles and Themistocles come from? In *Meno* Plato emphasizes several times that "knowledge is recollection" and "learning is recollection"(81c, 81e, 85d). "Recollection" is a process of "a reemergence from what has always existed within the interior of our soul".[113]

Reale points out that in the eyes of many scholars, the Platonic doctrine "learning is recollection" has absolutely no value because " it is only a myth and not at all of a dialectical and theoretical character".[114] Reale, however, thinks that they partly misunderstood Plato's meaning. He argues, "The *Meno* presents the doctrine in a twofold manner, one *mythically* and the other *dialectically*".[115] The meaning of the former is: Plato tells us before the soul entering the body, it has already possessed the

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[113] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.117
[114] *Ibid.*, p.117
[115] *Ibid.*, p.117

truth which it has learnt somewhere (P.II, p.169).[116] The soul, however, has forgotten what it has learnt after entering the body. So, it is easy to understand why Plato denies that "knowledge" is obtained through sophists' way of teaching. Actually, Plato does provide a good solution to the *Meno*'s paradox at the same time.[117] It is because "knowledge" indeed is already inside our soul. Reale says:

> Recollection structurally supposes a mark impressed in the soul from the Idea, an original metaphysical "vision" of the ideal world that still, even if veiled, remains in the soul of each one of us.[118]

The question is: how does Plato prove that learning is nothing other than recollecting? The *Meno*'s mythical manner changes immediately into the dialectical one. Plato tries to clarify his saying by " a piece of factual experimentation".[119] He uses the example of geometry to prove that only through the process of dialectic—the process of answer and question and some visible diagrams, the slave boy recollects the truth, which is naturally inside his soul. In this case Michael Meyer regards that "recollection" is the source and the basis of knowledge.[120]

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[116] Cf. Jaeger, P. II, p.169. Jaeger states that in *Meno* Plato has just only outlined the doctrine of immortality and pre-existence of the soul. This doctrine is worked out in detail in *Phaedo, The Republic, Phaedrus* and *The Laws.*

[117] Meno's paradox (80d-e): "I understand the point you would make, Meno. Do you see what a captious argument you are introducing—that, forsooth, a man cannot inquire either about what he knows or about what he does not know? For he know it, and in that case is in no need of inquiry; nor again can he inquire about what he does not know, since he does not know about what he is to inquire."

[118] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.122

[119] *Ibid.*, p.118

[120] Cf. Meyer, "Dialectic And Questioning: Socrates And Plato", p.285. Meyer emphasizes that in the Middle Dialogues "questioning" lost its position as a ground of knowledge; it I rather that "recollection" now is the source of knowledge.

Besides, in the above example we see also that "geometry" plays an important role in recollection. Gregory Vlastos says, " Geometrical discovery is being taken as paradigmatic recollection and therewith that knowledge of geometry is taken as the paradigm of all knowledge, including moral knowledge"[121]. Both Jaeger (P.II, pp.166-167)[122] and Reale[123]share Vlasto's view.

In the process of dialectic, however, what the slave boy has recollected is not knowledge yet. It is opinion only. " At present these opinions, being newly aroused, have a dream-like quality"(*Meno* 84c). Opinions will not stay long because they will run away easily from the human mind (97e-98a). Here Plato distinguishes two concepts: "opinion"(*doxa*) and "knowledge"(*episteme*). If a man possesses only true opinion, his action is not always successful because he does not possess "the understanding of the cause"(98a), that is the Idea of the Good. True opinion can be transformed into knowledge only if "the same questions put to him on many occasions and in different ways"(84c-d). Knowledge is something constant. A man who has knowledge is always doing good because he possesses understanding of the cause. So in Platonic sense, knowledge comes to the soul only by recollecting.

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[121] Gregory Vlasto, "Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning-Point in Plato's Philosophical Development" in Hugh H.Benson ed., *Essay On The Philosophy of Socrates* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.143

[122] Cf. Jaeger, P.II, pp.166-167. Jaeger illustrates the importance of "mathematics" in the discussion of knowledge.

Through the process of answer and question, the soul is enlightened and it recollects the self-knowledge.

From the above discussion, "recollection" is dependent on "question" and "answer". For this reason, Alexander Nehamas, whose view is contrary to Meyer's that "questioning" is only a means to bring out recollection, argues that recollection "seems limited to a very small part of the process of learning".[124] "Recollection" is not the fundamental basis of knowledge. It is because "questioning" indeed is more fundamental. And Gadamer, who stresses always that "questioning" is the essential ground of knowledge,[125] stands on Nehamas' side.

On this point I agree with Nehmas and Gadamer. Firstly, if "questioning" is used as a means to bring out recollection, it is the only means that makes "recollection" possible. If one wants to recollect his knowledge, he must pursuit "questioning" at the same time because "recollection" and "questioning" are essentially the same. In this sense, "questioning" is both a means and a basis of knowledge. Secondly, in *Meno* Plato himself states also that the transformation from "opinion" to "knowledge"

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[123] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.120

[124] Alexander Nehamas, "Meno's Paradox" in Alexander Nehamas, *Virtues of Authenticity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p.17

[125] Cf. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 362-369. Gadamer attempts to recall the importance of "questioning" in Platonic dialectic.

indeed is based on "questioning" (*Meno* 84c-d). So, we may say that "questioning" is more fundamental than "recollection".

As stated above that "questioning" plays an essential part in the process of recollection, however, we have to stress one point that "questioning" is not arbitrary; only the "right questions" make recollection possible. Hence the method of questioning inevitably requires the most careful guidance on the part of the questioner.[126] Robin Barrow stresses:

> Socrates may not happen to so much telling or instructing, but he certainly steers the slave with considerable persistence; had he not done so the slave would presumably have stopped at the point at which he wrongly imagines that he has the right answer.[127]

It is clear that the questioner plays a very important role in the process of recollection: the slave boy is able to recollect his self-knowledge only if Socrates poses the right questions to him. During the whole process Socrates has to know what he is doing: he cannot have directed the slave boy in a right way without knowing what the solutions are, what he is looking for and, then, when and in what way the slave boy is wrong at

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[126] Robin Barrow, *Plato and Education* (London; Boston: Routledge & K. Paul, 1976), p.35
[127] *Ibid.*, p.35

certain points.[128] The questioner must be the one who possesses knowledge so that he is able to judge what is the right question and sets against the opposite and gives the right guidance to people.[129]

Hence in Plato's theory learning is nothing other than recollection or questioning. It is because Plato has given knowledge a new meaning, as Paul Woodruff puts.[130] Platonic knowledge means self-knowledge. The Platonic education method is a revolutionary one. It is because the Platonic Socrates regarded himself as a midwife but not a teacher, while the sophists claim themselves to be teachers. He just gives the right guidance to the slave boy to recollect his self-knowledge but has no intention of "filling the soul with knowledge poured in from outside" (P.II, p.169). Socrates says that he does not teach. Even if we call Socrates' maieutic method as "teaching", Plato gives "teaching" a new meaning. Jaeger says:

> It is true that new *paideia* is not teachable as the sophists understood teaching: so Socrates was right to say that he did not teach men—not by giving them information. But by asserting that virtue must be knowledge and making his way towards that knowledge, he took the place of those false prophets of wisdom, as the only real educator (P.II, pp.171-172).[131]

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[128] *Ibid.*, p.35

[129] It is certain the questioner who possesses knowledge means philosopher-king. In Plato's view only the philosopher-king is able to give a right guidance hence only the philosopher-king can be the educator in the state.

[130] Cf. Woodruff, "Plato's Early Theory of Knowledge", p.103

"Recollection" is a process. So, Plato's goal of *paideia* is to complete this process and to reach the highest reality—the Good. Once this process is completed, the human personality reaches its perfection. What kind of process is the building up of the ideal human personality?

3.5. The process of *paideia*: building up of the ideal human personality in the three analogies in *The Republic*

Platonic *paideia* is a gradual and a dialectical process. In *The Republic* Plato uses three analogies to illustrate this process; namely, the analogies of the Sun, the Line and the Cave. According to Jaeger, the analogy of the sun represents mainly the metaphysical aspect of *paideia* (P.II, p.288); the analogy of the line emphasizes on the epistemological aspect (P.II, p.288) and the analogy of the cave is the practical aspect (P.II, p.291). Among these three analogies, Jaeger focuses his discussion on "the analogy of the cave" because it is the most important for illustrating the process of *paideia*.

Many philosophers try to interpret the analogy of the cave from different angles. Some says that this analogy is an impressive symbol of the various ontological grades

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[131] Barrow shares the same view with Jaeger. See Barrow, *Plato and Education*, p.35

of being; some treats it as a symbol of the degrees of knowledge in their different levels and in their various grades; some regards it as representing the ascetic, mystical, theological or political aspects of Platonism.[132] Certainly we cannot say that the above interpretations are incorrect or inappropriate. In fact they provide us with different possible ways for a better understanding of this parable. From Jaeger's point of view, he is not going to deny the correctness or appropriateness of these interpretations, but he has different understanding of Plato's main task in this analogy. Jaeger considers that the main task of this parable is on *paideia* (P.II, p.294) and Plato has added his own explanation, which is clear, brief, and complete. Martin Heidegger shares also this point of view. He states in his article "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" that "Plato's assertion is clear: the allegory of the cave illustrates the essence of education (*paideia*)".[133] Both Jaeger's and Heidegger's views are based on the first sentence of the seventh book of *The Republic*:

> "Next," said I, "compare our nature in respect of education (*paideia*) and its lack to such an experience as this (514a)

Jaeger stresses that the analogy of the cave is "an image of *paideia*: or, more exactly, it represents the nature of man, and its relation to culture and unculture, *paideia* and

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[132] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, pp.234-235

[133] Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" in Martin Heidegger, William McNeill ed.,

apaideusia" (P.II, p.294). The image of the cave, unlike the analogy of the sun and the line, "treats *paideia* not in the absolute sense", "but from the point of view of humanity as the transformation and enlightenment of the soul till it reaches the point when it can see the vision of the supreme reality" (PII, p.294). Heidegger states that Plato's illustration in the analogy of the cave is very clear: it deals with the essence of *paideia* ------ "real education lays hold of the soul itself and transform it in its entirety by first of all leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it".[134] If we want to illustrate the process of *paideia*, it is necessary to start our investigation with this parable.

The process of *paideia* ------ the process of transformation of the soul from the state of *apaideusia* to *paideia*, begins at the underground cave. The prisoners are having their legs and necks fettered since childhood. For this reason they cannot turn their heads. They can look forward only. At a distance behind them there is a fire burning higher up. Between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low walls has been built, like the exhibitors, upon which partitions show the puppets. Some men behind the wall are carrying all sorts of figures of human and animals, which are made of wood and stone. And the shadows of human and the

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Pathmarks (Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.167

[134] *Ibid.*, p.167

animal are shown above the wall. Some prisoners are talking and others keep silent (*The Republic* 514a-b).

As the prisoners are having their legs and necks chained, they are not able to turn their heads. For this reason, they have never seen anything except the shadows. Now the prisoners "would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects"(515c). The prisoners hold that the shadow is the only reality (515c).

One prisoner is released from his fetters and he is compelled to stand up, turns his head around and looks towards the light and the objects themselves. The glow of fire, which gives the light, makes the objects visible and gives sight to the eyes. The brightness of the light makes his eyes feel pain. He is not able to see the fire itself and the objects whose shadows he has seen before. If anyone tells him that the shadows he has seen before is an illusion and now what he sees is "being nearer to reality"(515d), he should feel very confused at the moment. He believes the shadows are more real than the objects because he can see the shadows without confusion (515c-d).

But, if someone wants to drag him to the upper world, he needs habituation; otherwise his eyes are going to be harmed by the light of the sun. At first he would

most easily discern the shadows and likeness or reflections of man and other things in water. To him, the shadows in water are more real than the shadows and the objects he has seen in the cave. For this reason, he denies the realities of the shadows and the objects of the cave. He holds that the shadow in water is the reality (515e-516b)

Later, his eyes direct to the things themselves. At first it would be easier for him to look at the sky, the stars and the moon at night than under the sun and the sunlight. Finally, he would see the sun itself and see its true nature—not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting, but in and by itself in its own place. Now he would conclude: the sun is the cause of the seasons and of the year. It is the master of everything in the visible world. On the other hand, the sun is the cause of the things, which he and his fellow-prisoners used to see in the cave (516b-c). He would reject what he has seen before is the reality. He thinks that the sun is "the truest" (484c).

Plato's interpretation in this analogy, according to Jaeger, is very clear as soon as "we connect it with the two preceding metaphors, the comparison of the Idea of Good to the sun, and the mathematical ration between the different degrees of knowledge and reality"(P.II, pp.292-293). The cave corresponds to the Visible World (or the Sensible World) while the fire in the cave to the sun. Both the fire and the sun are the

causes of the visibility of the objects and the sight. But the fire and the sun themselves are not the objects. In fact they are more valuable than the objects and the sight. At the beginning of the process of *paideia*, we use our senses (from Plato's point of view, "eyes" are the most valuable among the senses because they are the most sun-like) to apprehend the visible world. The things we apprehend first are "sensible images", which are symbolized by the vision of the shadows. And the knowledge we get is "belief" (*pistis*). At the second stage what we apprehend are "sensible objects", which are symbolized by the vision of the objects. And we have "imagination" (*eikasia*). Both "belief" and "imagination" belong to the field of "opinion" (*doxa*).

The world outside the cave corresponds to the World of Ideas (or the Intelligible World) while the sun to the Idea of Good. Both the sun and the Idea of Good are the causes of visibility of the objects and the ideas. The sun and the Idea of Good themselves, however, are not objects and ideas although they are visible. In fact they are more valuable than objects and ideas. In the World of Idea we use our reasons to apprehend the World of Idea. The things we apprehend firstly are the "mathematical objects", which are symbolized by the shadows in the water. The knowledge we obtain is "mediate knowledge" (*dianoia*). Later we apprehend "ideas" and "Idea of the Good", which are symbolized by the objects and the sun. The knowledge we

achieve is "intellection" (*noesis*). Both "mediate knowledge" and "intellection" belong to the field of knowledge (*episteme*).

From the above discussion, it is obvious that the process of transformation of the soul from the state of a*paideusia* to *paideia* is an ascending dialectic. It " frees the soul from the senses and from the sensible, and goes on to the Ideas and then, from Idea to Idea, to the supreme Idea with a *synopis* method (which slowly embraces the multiplicity in a unity)".[135] So in Plato's theory of education, the meaning of *paideia* is not pouring the knowledge into the ignorant soul, as the sophist do (P.II, p.295). The essence of *paideia* is "conversion" (*metastrophe*) of the soul (P.II, p.295). In the metaphysical aspect "conversion of the soul" means transformation of "the whole soul towards the light of the Good, which is the divine origin of the universe"(518c-d); in the epistemological aspect, as Ludwig C.H.Chen said, the conversion of the soul is "the shifting of his soul from its position in the present cognitive stage to the higher stage, and still higher if there is any, until the goal (the Idea of the Good) is reached"[136] and in the practical aspect it means a total transformation of one's vision, life-style and behaviour, as Pierre Hadot emphasized.[137] As soon as the whole process

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[135] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.125

[136] Ludwig C.H.Chen, *Acquiring Knowledge of The Ideas* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1992), p.123

[137] Hadot, Pierre, Arnold Davidson ed., *Philosophy as a Way of Life: From Socrates to Foucault*, trans. Michael Chase (Oxford; New York: Blackwell, 1995), p.103

of conversion is completed, the ideal personality is established.

The process of *paideia,* however, does not end with attaining the highest reality outside the cave. At the end of the analogy, the free prisoner has to turn back to the cave because he feels pity of his fellow-prisoners. But, if he goes down to the cave, he will get his eyes full of darkness and he feels confused again. His fellow men would say that he has returned with his eyes ruined. If this free man tries to release them and lead them up, the chained prisoners will kill him immediately (517a).

As Heidegger points out, the main concern of the analogy of the cave is to clarify the essence of *paideia.* " This clarification must also manifest precisely this essential factor, the constant overcoming of lack of education".[138] Even though the free prisoner has got to the highest reality, the environment around him is full of danger and risk of succumbing of the highest reality by the empirical reality.[139] If he cannot take any resistance, he will properly ruined by the sensible world again. His soul will likely turn back to the state of *apaideusia.* Plato says:

> "But a sensible man," I said, "would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light, and, believing that the same thing

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[138] Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, p.171
[139] *Ibid.*, p.171

happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its vision. And so he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at it, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above." (518a-b)

As mentioned in the introduction, *paideia* is a lifelong process. It does not mean that the ideal human personality is completed or the process of *paideia* ends after getting to the highest reality. According to Heidegger, the return to the cave shows that the ideal personality can be lost again, if a man fails to resist the dangerous environment around him. Plato says that *paideia* is a lifelong struggle of the soul to free itself from ignorance and to remain permanent in the highest reality—the Idea of the Good.

From the above discussion, we can conclude that the essence of *paideia* must include two aspects, namely, "transformation of the soul" and "the constant overcoming of *apaideusia*".

In the parable of the cave, however, Plato leaves a question unanswered. The whole process of *paideia*, as mentioned above, is an ascending dialectic. The free prisoner recognizes firstly the image of the objects and then the objects themselves in the cave. After that he gets to the images of the objects in water and then the objects

themselves. Finally he attains to the sun—the highest reality. During the whole process there is a kind of urging force, which makes the prisoner direct his way to this highest reality. The question is: what is that kind of force? What makes him pursue the ideal human personality even though it is a very difficult thing to do so?

To this question, Jaeger has a good answer. It is that Eros is man's instinctive urge to develop his own ideal human personality (P.II, p.195). The concept of "Eros", which is the subject matter of *Symposium*, does not mean every kind of desire. It is limited to a definite type of desire—the desire for Beauty. "And since Beauty, for the Greeks, is identical with Good, or it is generally an aspect of Good",[140] so "desire for Beauty" and "desire for Good" have the same meaning. And desire for the Good, which "is natural and essential to our nature" is "at the same time the urge of human nature towards real-fulfillment and self-completion" (P.II, pp.189-190). So Eros, as Pierre Hadot says, is the desire for perfection—the ideal human personality.[141] Although the way to the ideal personality is a lifelong process full of difficulties, Eros is the force that makes a man to pursue and to possess the ideal personality forever. In this sense, Eros "is therefore the impulse towards education and culture in the truest sense" (P.II, p.190).

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[140] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy Plato and Aristotle*, p.170
[141] Cf. Pierre Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life: From Socrates to Foucault*, p.162

The free man has to turn back to the cave. It is because the ideal personality can only be achieved in the Sensible World, that is, in the state. In the coming section we are going to discuss the relationship between the "the ideal human personality" and "the state".

3.6. Plato's concept of the relationship between "the ideal human personality" and "the state"

According to Jaeger, the primary interest of Plato in *The Republic* is the human soul (P.II, p.199). So "everything else he says about the state and its structure is introduced merely to give an enlarged image of the soul and its structure" (P.II, p.199). It seems that the establishment of the ideal human personality has nothing to do with the state. The question is: what does the state mean to Plato? (P.II, p.198) Or, what is the relationship between "the ideal human personality" and "the state" (politics)? A.E.Taylor says:

> It has sometimes been asked whether the *Republic* is to be regarded as a contribution to ethics or to politics. Is its subject righteousness, or is it the ideal City-State? The answer is that from the point of view of Socrates and Plato there is no distinction, except one of convenience, between morals and politics. The laws of right are the same for classes and cities as for individual men. But one must add that these laws are primarily laws of personal morality; politics is founded on ethics, not ethics on politics. The primary question raised in the

Republic and finally answered at its close is a strictly ethical one.[142]

According to Taylor, Plato has never seen "the ideal human personality" and "the state", or "the ideal human personality" and "the politics" as separated each other. In our time, we can hardly see that there is any close relationship these two cannons. However, in Plato's point of view "the ideal human personality" and "the state" indeed are correlated.

At the beginning of this chapter we have mentioned that the reconstruction of the state must start from the reformation of the soul. It is the reason that Plato starts his discussion on "justice" with "justice of the soul", but not on "the justice of the state". It is because Plato knows very well that "the just state" (the perfect state) bases on "the just soul" (the ideal human personality). In this sense, there is no question of the importance of the ideal personality to the perfect state. The ideal personality is more fundamental than the perfect state. Now the question is: what does the state mean to the ideal human personality? Or, what is the position of the state in building up of the ideal human personality?

In the introduction we have pointed out that *paideia* is a practice concerning both

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[142] Taylor, *Plato: The Man and his Work*, p.265

the state and the individual man. Man is essentially a political animal, as Aristotle holds in *Politics* (1253a2-3). For this reason, man cannot live without the state. Taylor shares also this point of view:

> At the same time no man lives to himself, and the man who is advancing to beatitude community at large.[143]

Plato stresses in the analogy of the cave that after attaining the highest reality—the Idea of the Good, the philosopher must return to the cave to guide the whole state and to take up the position of educator to educate his fellow-men (in Platonic sense, only the philosopher is able to attain to the Idea of the Good. He should be the king to guide the state to happiness. This point will be discussed at the end of this section). In *The Republic* Plato emphasizes:

> "It is the duty of us, the founders, then, " said I, "to compel the best natures (the philosophers) to attain the knowledge (the knowledge of the Idea of the Good) which we pronounced the greatest, and to win to the vision of the good, to scale that ascent, and when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is the now permitted." "What is that?" "That they should linger there," I said, "and refuse to go down again among those bondsmen and share their labours and honours, whether they are of less or of greater worth." (519d)

From the above passage, we see that there is a strong sense of social duty of the

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[143] *Ibid.*, p.266

philosopher. His true personality does not lie in his own happiness, but rather in the happiness of the whole state. It is because guiding the whole state to happiness is his duty. However, the philosopher who takes part in the political affairs is not only for the interest of the state as Karl Popper holds, [144]but also for another aim—developing his true personality. He is performing his duty while establishing his ideal personality. He must be the statesman of the state for the sake of the ideal human personality.

On the other hand, Plato believes that only in the ideal state the can philosopher receive the right education and become a true statesman (P.II, p300).[145] Jaeger says, "state is an educational force" (P.II, p.400 n., 8). Besides, only in the ideal state can the philosopher fulfill his duty. Hence, the philosopher has to be the statesman for the sake of the ideal personality. For the above reasons, "the philosopher would have society to thank for his *paideia*, and therefore for his whole intellectual existence: so he would be ready to pay the cost of his upbringing" (P.II, p.300).

From the above discussion, it is obvious that the state is essential to the ideal human personality. Jaeger holds that in Plato's theory, building up the state indeed means nothing other than building up the ideal human personality (P.II, p.199). Reale

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144 Cf. K.R.Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies Vol. I* (London: Routledge, 1991), p.147

145 In Plato's scheme of education, the philosophers are the founders of right education because they

also shares this view:

> Plato wishes to know and form the perfect City-State to know and to form the perfect man.[146]

It is apparent that the ideal personality and the state are closely related. But one thing we have to bear in mind: the Platonic state here does not refer to any empirical examples such as Sparta or Athens. Jaeger says:

> Plato is not dealing with the relation between *paideia* and any one historical state using its as a political instrument, but with the *paideia* as directed towards the divine end, the Idea of the Good, that lies at the center of the perfect state. (P.II, p.400 n.8)

Any empirical state is not worthy of being a model for establishing the ideal state. It is because the ideal state must be based on the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is the only model for the ideal state. What is the meaning of the ideal state? In *The Republic* Plato says:

> "Then a just man too will not differ at all from a just city in respect of the very form of justice, but will be like it." "Yes, like." "But now the city was thought to be just because three natural kinds existing in it performed each its own functions, and again it was sober, brave, and wise because of certain other

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are the only class which possess the knowledge of the Good.

[146] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.191

affections and habits of these three kinds" "True," he said. (435b)

We have discussed in section 3.2 that the ideal human personality or the just soul means that each part of the soul does its own work without interfering with one another. That is, "reason" should rule while "spirit" and "desire" be ruled. The state, like the soul, is composed of three different social classes, which correspond to the three capacities in the soul: "the philosopher" (the guardian) to "reason", the warriors to "spirit" and "the working-class" to "desire". The just state or the Platonic state means that each class does its own work according to its nature, namely, the philosopher should rule while the warriors and the working-class be ruled. The Platonic state is a state in which "each citizen and each class attends to its proper role in the best way".[147]

According to Plato, the ideal state can be actualized only if the philosophers become the kings in the states or the king studies philosophy (473d). It is because the philosopher is the only group that can attain the Idea of the Good. And they are the only class that can achieve the highest education and perfection of personality. In the next chapter we are going to deal with the practical aspects of the theory of the ideal human personality, in which the education of philosophers is our focus of discussion.

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[147] *Ibid.*, p.195

Chapter 4 Theory of the ideal human personality in the philosophy of Plato in the practical aspects: education of the philosopher

In Chapter Three we have scrutinized the theoretical aspects of Plato's theory of the self. Jaeger emphasizes that "the ultimate interest of Plato's *The Republic* is the human soul" (P.II, p199). However, "even in the problem of the soul, Plato's interest is not theoretical but practical" (P.II, p199). Platonic *paideia* is not an abstract theory without content. On the contrary, Plato's discussion on the practical aspects of *paideia* is an important part of *The Republic*. The question is: who is the object of Platonic *paideia*? What subjects should be included in or excluded from the scheme, and what is Plato's justification? In this chapter the practical aspect of Plato's theory of the ideal human personality is the central object.

We have mentioned that the highest education is not possible for everyone. Plato's main task of education, as Jaeger points out, "is to choose the fittest natures and educates them correctly so as to mould" (P.II, p209). There is no doubt that "the fittest natures" means "philosophers". However, when we investigate the theory of education in *The Republic*, we will see that Plato's education proposal is not limited to the philosopher. According to Jaeger, Plato's education scheme focuses on three

categories of citizens, namely, education of the guards, education of women, and education of the philosopher (P.II, p209).[148] For this reason, we may say that his education scheme is possible and education should be available to everyone in the polis although "the fittest natures" is the only group that is able to attain the highest degree of education. The philosopher is the only class which can achieve self-perfection.

Among these three categories, Jaeger takes "the education of the ruler" as the most important one. In this chapter my discussion will focus on the education of philosophers.

4.1. Education on "music" and "gymnastics"-----reform of the old *paideia*

The philosopher's education must begin with the education of the guards,[149] which includes two traditional cannons—"music" and "gymnastics". In the Platonic proposal "music" and "gymnastics", which are taught to children until they are 20 years old, belong to the first stage of the education proposal. Under the discussion of

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[148] According to Jaeger, Plato's proposal of education of women is truly revolutionary for his time, since the women "are meant by nature only to the bear children, bring them up, and look after the household" (P.II, p.244). Plato admits that the women are less strong than men, but they are able to take the guards' duties. So, if the women are to do the same work as the men, they should have the same education. See also *The Republic* 454d-457b.

[149] We have mentioned in section 3.5 that *paideia* is a gradual process, so the education of the philosophers has to begin with the education of the guards.

these two cannons, Plato shows us his conservative outlook in regard to the traditional Greek scheme of *paideia* because he intends to preserve its value. Jaeger states that Plato's preservation of the traditional Greek *paideia* is due to two main reasons. Firstly, Plato wants to ensure "the continuity and organic unity of the development of Greek culture, both formally and substantially" (P.II, p211). It is because he does not want a total break with the tradition at the moment of cultural crisis (P.II, p211). Secondly, Plato recognizes that both "music" and "gymnastics" are essential parts of his proposal of education. This point will be explained later. For the above reasons, Plato takes the traditional *paideia*—"gymnastics" for the body and "music" for the soul (P.II, p.210), as the basis of his education scheme.

Although Plato preserves "music" and "gymnastic" as the basis of his *paideia*, he does not just simply take them up without any reformation. Plato intends to reform them in order to fit them into his education programme. Hence "preserving" and "reforming" are two main characteristics in his whole educational project.

According to Plato, we must begin with the education of the soul—"music "(376e). "Music", as Jaeger states, "is not simply a matter of sound and

rhythm" (P.II, p211), as our common sense holds. The Greek word *mousike*[150]. (music) means also the spoken word—*logos*[151] (P.II, p.211). In traditional education, *logos* denotes mainly "poetry". Hence the word "music" means both "poetry" and "music" (sound and rhythm). Plato starts his discussion with poetry.

Poetry, as we have mentioned in Chapter Two, played the predominant role in the Greek *paideia* since Homer. Poetry became the main educational instrument. For this reason, the educational value of poetry was beyond doubt. Plato's attitude to its educational value, however, is negative. Plato declares clearly that the content of the poetry, which is usually used to educate the children, is not true (377a). The children, who are at "the easiest and most sensitive stage of man's development" and at "the age of easily shaped"(P.II, p.212), are most likely to be under the influence of these untrue stories. For example, in Hesiod' poetry Cronons ate his sons and daughters (378a). Once these ideas get into a child's head, it is very difficult to guide his soul to the right way again. It is because his soul has already been permanently and deeply shaped by these untrue stories.

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[150] Cf.. *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, online edition. The definition of *mousike* includes: (a) any art over which the Muses presided, esp. poetry sung to music; (b) art or letters

[151] *Logos* is one of the most problematical classical Greek terms. It is widely discussed by the philosophers such as Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle. Except the meaning of "spoken word", *logos* has numerous meanings such as 'reason", "rational faculty", "account" and "calculation". See the general

The morally unworthy poetry should be banned not only from the children, but also from the guards and the rulers because of several reasons. Firstly, in the tenth book of *The Republic*, Plato calls poetry as "the copy of copy" (598d-600e) and he uses the analogy of "painting" to explain it in details. God is the maker of the Idea of the bed and the carpenter bases on the Idea of the bed to create the bed. The painter does not imitate the bed as it is, but "he imitates the bed which is created by the carpenter as it appears from the side or the front".[152] In this situation, the painter's imitations are at three generations away from real being (the Idea of the bed)" (598e). The painter is an imitator, but not a creator of the bed (597d). In Plato's eyes, there is no difference between the painter and the poet because both of them are "imitators". The poets try to tell something true about gods and heroes through their writings. However, they fail to do so (P.II, p.217). For example, the great poet Homer undertook "to speak, wars and generalship and the administration of cities and the education of men" (599d). Neither Homer himself had been a good legislator like Lycurgus and Solon; nor did he win any wars during his life, nor did he have any ingenious inventions as Thales did; nor was he honoured by the later-comers as Pythagoras was.[153] It is because Homer, and other poets as well, "are the imitators of

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meanings of *logos* in *Liddell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Classical Greek*, online edition.

[152] Elizabeth Asmis, "Plato on poetic creativity" in Richard Kraut ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.356

[153] Cf. Wang Tzu-sung et al., *Hsi-la che hsueh shih. Vol. 2.*, p.816

images of excellence and of the other things that they create" (600e). The poets neither have "knowledge" nor " true opinion". Hence they did not know whether the things they portrayed are good or bad. Plato insists that this type of poetry and poet must be excluded and expelled from the Republic.

Secondly, Plato has already stated that everyone should do his own job without doing the others in the discussion on "justice". A good guard only understands his own job, that is the defense of the state (395b-c). So a good guard "will not admit the wish and the ability to imitate many others things" (P.II, p.223), as the poets and the actors do in the poetries and in the performance respectively.

Thirdly, Plato puts forward another argument with the support of several quotations from Homer. Plato attempts to prove that poetry tends to prevent courage and self-control, which are the two essential virtues of the guards, from developing (389d-391a). For this reason, the type of poetry which discourages the development of self-control and courage must be prohibited.

"Plato's sharpest attack on poetry" is "the poet's conception of God and of divine government" (P.II, p.217). From Homeric epic to Attic tragedy, the most essential

characteristic of the Greek poetry was "to treat the destiny of man as dependent on the power of the gods" (P.II, p.218). God was the *moira* (destiny) of the world. Hence God was the cause of everything that occurs; be it good or bad (P.II, p.218). Man, even if he was of the finest and noblest nature, could not escape from "destiny". Plato, however, rejects this traditional view of god immediately. It is because his ideal world is based on the assumption that "each individual shapes on moral course through life towards what he has seen of the Good" (Plato sometimes calls the Ideal of Good as "the God") (P.II, p.218). In this sense, "the rule of *moira*" is absolutely excluded (P.II, p.218). On the other hand, the Platonic concept of God is good by nature. For this reason, it is not possible that the Good is capable of leading men to do anything evil (391d-e); otherwise *paideia* is meaningless (P.II, p.218). So, the type of poetry, in which the poets hold the wrong concept of God, must be banned.

After his discussion on poetry, Plato turns to "music" (398c-400e), which includes four aspects, namely, melody, rhythms, words and instruments. In Platonic sense, "sentimental or schmaltzy melodies that tenderize the soul ought to be eliminated".[154] Only those melodies, which assist development of the virtues, are permitted.[155] For example, the Dorian mode of music is for developing "courage"

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[154] Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p. 193
[155] Kathleen Freeman, *God, Man and State*, (Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1970), p.187

while the Phrygian for "wisdom" and "prudence" (399a-c).[156] This is the same case in rhythms and in instruments. Only those rhythms which "conducive to grace and harmony of body and mind" are admitted.[157] Both the melody and rhythms must suit the words (398d)[158] and the words must be edifying.[159] And the instruments such as flutes, harps and triangles should be banned (399c).

From the above discussion, poetry and music seem harmful rather than beneficial to the soul. Why does Plato still keep "music" as an essential part of the education of the guards and the philosophers? In fact, Plato does not aim at criticizing "music" as such whole. He just wants to expel those types of poetry which are "morally objectionable"[160] and "incompatible with the standards of philosophy" (P.II, p.215), as mentioned above. On the contrary, those types of poetry and myth which are compatible with the philosophy should be preserved. On the other hand, Plato does not aim at suppressing all types of "copy of copy". Indeed Platonic criticism does not aim at "imitation" as such, but at what sorts of object that the poetry imitates, as Nehamas holds.[161] The type of poetry which imitates the noble man should be

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[156] *Ibid.*, p.187
[157] *Ibid.*, p.187
[158] See Plato, *Plato V*, trans. Paul Shorey p.246 n. a. Shorey explains the reason that the melody and rhythms must suit the words, "The poets at first composed their own music to fit the words. When, with the further development of music, there arose the practice of distorting the words, as in a mere libretto, it provoked a storm of protest from conservatives in aesthetics and morals."
[159] Cf. Freeman, *God, Man and State*, p.187
[160] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.193
[161] Cf. Nehamas, "Plato on Imitation and Poetry in *Republic* X" in *Virtues of Authenticity*, p.253.

permitted and encouraged (398a-b). Plato adopts the same attitude towards music: only those "express the *ethos* (good) of a brave or temperate man" (P.II, p.227) ought to be chosen (399a-c).

The most important reason for Plato to preserve poetry is: Plato treats poetry "as a means of reaching the knowledge of the absolute truth" (P.II, p.215). Plato says:

> "Don't you understand", I said, "that we begin by telling children fables, and the fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is truth in it also? And we make use of fable with children before gymnastics."(377a)

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the way to absolute knowledge is a gradually ascending process. The philosopher must begin his journey with "the copy of copy" because they have "something true". For this reason, Plato "preserves the poetry, as the best method of education, and as an expression of higher truth" (P.II, p.215).

After setting up half of his first stage of *paideia*, Plato now turns to the other, "gymnastics" (P.II, p.230), which lasts for two to three years (537b). According to Plato, "gymnastics" should come after "music" because it is not that "a sound body by its excellence make the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue

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Nehamas rejects Tate's view that there are two senses of "imitation" and Nehamas argues that "all that is implied is that one and the same activity can have different sorts of objects".

renders the body the best that is possible" (403d). For this reason, Plato pays more attention to "music" and it should go before gymnastics.

Plato's view on gymnastics is revolutionary. In the ancient Greek tradition, gymnastics was regarded as "the highest type of physical strength" (P.II, p.231). So it was reasonable and logical that gymnastics played a dominant role in the physical training of the guards and the rulers (403e). Plato, however, turns to the spiritual strengthening of the soul rather than physical improvement of the body. It seems that "gymnastics" loses its superior position in education. If it was the case, "why do the guards have to do all the exercises and undergo all the exertions prescribed by gymnastics" (P.II, p.233)? Plato explains:

> And even the exercises and toils of gymnastics he will undertake with a view to the spiritual part of his nature to arouse that rather than for mere strength, unlike ordinary athletes, who treat diet and exercise only as a means to muscle (410b).

Plato includes "gymnastics" in his education project so as to develop the spiritual element of "courage" rather than to gain physical strengths. Hence it is not appropriate to say that gymnastics has nothing to do with spiritual training (410c). However, Plato reminds us that "gymnastics ought to be appropriate and simple,

avoiding any kind of excess".[162]

In Plato's education scheme, music and gymnastics, "the inseparable unity of *paideia*" (P.II, p.234), must go together. It is because "a purely gymnastic training make a man too hard and violent, and too much music would make him soft and tame" (P.II, p.234).[163] Both music and gymnastics are for building up the soul: musical training is responsible for the rational part of the soul while gymnastic training for the irascible part. They work together in order to produce harmony in the soul (411e).

The education of the guards comes to an end when the training of "music" and "gymnastic" is completed. However, the education of the rulers is not yet finished. In the following section, we are going to deal with the higher education of philosopher—the training in "mathematics" and " dialectic".

4.2. Education of the philosopher------"mathematics" as *propaideia*

As mentioned in Chapter Three, Plato's goal of *paideia* is transformation of "the whole soul towards the light of the Good"(518c-d). Plato, however, does not think

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[162] See Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.193 and *The Republic* 403c
[163] See also *The Republic* 410d

that it can be achieved by "music" and "gymnastics" alone. It is because gymnastics concerns mainly with the growth and decay of the body while music creates only harmony and rhythm of the soul. Neither of them gives us any knowledge of the Good (521e-5221). The question is: what kind of knowledge can lead to the "conversion of the soul from the visible world to the world of Idea"?

According to Plato, the knowledge of "arithmetic" and "geometry" can lead to the conversion of the soul (522c). Later, Plato extends them to other branches of mathematical sciences (P.II, p.301).[164] The mathematical sciences, music and gymnastics, "are indispensable preparation for dialectics"—the final stage of education (536d).

In traditional Greek education, especially in the 4th century, mathematical sciences were important in the art of war. Surely Plato recognizes its importance because the ruler also has to deal with military affairs. However, the military value of mathematics is not the chief reason for which Plato includes it in his education scheme. Indeed Plato adopts a new standard to justify the value of mathematics. He says:

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[164] See also *The Republic* 525b-c

> It seems likely that it (mathematics) is one of those studies which we are seeking that naturally conduce to the awakening of though, but that no one makes the right use of it, though it really does tend to draw the mind to essence and reality (523a).

Plato's view on mathematics is a revolutionary one. Plato thinks that the function of mathematics is to awake the mind towards the reality. For this reason, mathematics must be included in the philosopher's education project.

Besides arithmetic and geometry, Plato's mathematical sciences include also "astronomy" (527d) and the science of harmony—"music" (531a). Pythagoreans call them "kindred sciences"(530d). When Plato mentions these two kindred sciences, he shows his respect to the Pythagoreans because they are "the greatest authority of this branch of knowledge" (P.II, p.303).

Plato's understanding of astronomy, however, is contrary to that of the Pythagoreans. Plato stresses:

> I said, "for apparently of anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by starting at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason and not with the eyes" (529b).

Like arithmetic and geometry, the goal of astronomy is to compel the rational part of

the soul to look upwards and to lead it to the World of Idea (529a). Eyes, however, cannot grasp this reality. If anyone intends to learn the reality by sense, he can learns nothing (529b).

Plato also adopts a new point of view on the function of harmonies. In the case of investigating the harmony of "numbers", Plato pays no attention to the scattered observation of numbers. It is because what he really concerns is: "which numbers are inherently concordant and which are not and why in each case" (531c). And this is done by our thought. On the contrary, Pythagoreans concerned mainly with "scattered observations of numbers, lines and surfaces, the visible phenomena of the sky, and audible sounds and concords" (P.II, p.303). In Plato's view, the Pythagorean theory of harmonies can never lead us to the highest reality because it is done by the sense, but not the thought.

According to Jaeger, in addition to the above four traditional branches of mathematics, Plato himself introduces a new branch—stereometry (or "solid geometry)[165] (P.II, p.305). Stereometry is the study of "the dimension of cubes and of

[165] Cf. W.K.C.Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.523

everything that has depth" (528b). In John Burnet's[166] and Jaeger's opinions, Plato includes stereometry in his mathematical education because he is under the influence of Theaetetus, who is regarded as the introducer of stereometry to the Academy (P.II, p.305). Jaeger thinks that "the introduction of the stereometry is a surprise" because this subject does not appear to have been investigated at the epoch of Plato[167]. Why does Plato introduce this new subject in his education scheme? Unfortunately, neither Plato nor Jaeger gives us any further explanation. But, Plato's intention can easily be explained. Stereometry, like other branches of mathematics, aims at stimulating the thought to the highest reality.

Plato is always being criticized for his mathematical education. Firstly, Plato seems to expel "sensation" and "empirical experience" from mathematical education. Gregory Vlastos in his essay "The Role of Observation in Plato's Conception of Astronomy" states this point clearly.[168] According to Vlasto, Plato is challenged by Thomas Health that he has banned sense perception and methodological empiricism from the science of astronomy. Actually, this criticism is not only limited to

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[166] Cf. John Burnet, *Platonism* (Berkeley: The University of California Press), 1928, pp.101-102

[167] According to Plato, "stereometry" did not appear to have been investigated at that time mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, there was no city to holds it in honour. Secondly, it was not easy to find an experienced director of the field of stereometry. See also *The Republic* 528b

[168] Cf. Gregory Vlasto, "The Role pf Observation in Plato's Conception of Astronomy" in Gregory Vlasto, Daniel W.Graham ed., *Studies in Greek Philosophy Vol. II: Socrates, Plato and Their Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p.223

astronomy, but it also extends to the whole mathematical education scheme. Secondly, Plato seems to emphasize only on the mathematical value but ignores the values of the other empirical sciences. Or in other words, the empirical sciences are worthy only if they involve "some branch of mathematics".[169] For this reason, "Plato was criticized for developing mathematics too strong" (P.II, p.308). J.C.B.Gosling shares also this point:

> It is belligerently stated that anything worth the name of *techne* or *episteme* must involves the use of numbers. Arithmetic, geometry and the rest therefore clearly emerge as the paradigm *technai*, and this seems to be an increasingly dominant view 〈 ..... 〉 It seems all too clear that rulers are to be encouraged to get away from practical pursuits such as medicine, strategy and the rest, however mathematically sophisticated, and simply study arithmetic and geometry.[170]

Facing these two criticisms, what is the possible response from Plato?

Vlasto, who disagrees with the first challenge, tries to defend Plato by the example of astronomy. The knowledge of astronomy always starts with "observation" of the empirical things such as stars and the moon in the sky. It is because we must have some facts to begin with, and these facts can only be derived from sensory

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[169] See J.C.B.Gosling, Ted Honderich ed., *Plato* (London; Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p.101

[170] *Ibid.*, p.101

observation.[171] It is the same in geometry. It is because we always have to do the investigation with visible figures. Although these visible objects can neither be expected "to be forever invariant and to be absolutely undeviating"[172] nor elevate the soul's eyes to the eternal world,[173] they play a significant role in the way to knowledge. Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason* used to say, "there can be no doubt that all our cognition begins with experience".[174] Plato's attitude to experience and sensation is the same as Kant's in this aspect. Plato recognizes that the way to knowledge must begin with "true opinion", which is obtained through visible objects and sensation. Hence Plato has no intention of banning the sense perception and experience in his mathematical education.

If we accept Vlasto's explanation, we can formulate Plato's possible response to the second challenge. Mathematics receive preferential treatment in Platonic *paideia* because it helps us to get to the final stage of education-- dialectic, which is the most important subject leading to the Idea of the Good. Although empirical sciences do not function as well as mathematics, they are helpful in leading the way to the Good as well. For this reason, Plato would not neglect the value of empirical sciences, as we

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[171] Cf. Vlasto, "The Role pf Observation in Plato's Conception of Astronomy" in Gregory Vlasto, Daniel W.Graham ed. *Studies in Greek Philosophy Vol. II: Socrates, Plato and Their Tradition*, p.237

[172] *Ibid.*, p.236

[173] *Ibid.*, p.236

[174] See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co.,

have mentioned above. But we have to remember: empirical sciences are valuable not because they involve "some branch of mathematics" as Gosling holds;[175] it is rather because they deal with dialectic (P.II, p.309). That is to say: empirical science can also function as a preparation for dialectic. In this sense, Plato would not regard empirical sciences as worthless.

When does mathematical training start? Like "music" and "gymnastics", the study of mathematics starts at the boyhood (536d) and it should primarily be introduced as *paidia*—"play". Plato says:

> "Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for a dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory. 〈 …… 〉 "True," he said. "Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play" (536d-537a).

Arthur A. Krentz points out that *paideia, paidia* (play), *paides* (children) are shown up in the same content because they are closely related to one another.[176] *Paideia* and *paidia* are two related concepts because they have the same root and both of them refer to the activity of *pais*—"the child" (P.II, p.317). In Plato's point of view, the first

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[175] Cf. Gosling, *Plato*, p.102

[176] Cf.Arthur A. Krentz, "Play and Education in Plato's *Republic*", p.5 in http//www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducKren.htm

mathematical lessons should be conducted though "play", but not a serious study.[177] Plato insists that teachers should not force children to learn mechanically (P.II, p.314). It is because anything that is learned under compulsion cannot stay in the mind (536e). Teachers should pose some mathematical questions, which are suitable for their age to children.

At the age of twenty, those who have the capacity to deal with the studies mentioned above will be selected for the higher education. They will be required to understand the relationship between the studies taken in the former education of childhood and to grasp the higher bonds of affinity existing between these studies and "the nature of being"(*tou ontos phusis*).[178] The training of this period, which starts from twenty and ends at thirty, is very important in determining which of them really possess the dialectical nature (537d). The dialectal nature is "the capacity to see things together (*sunopsis*)".[179] That is, the tendency of the soul "towards the whole (*holon*) and the all (*pan*)".[180] According to Plato, "dialectic" is "above all other studies to be as it were the copying-stone" (534e). It is the final stage of education.

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[177] Cf. Reale, *A History of Ancient Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle*, p.204
[178] *Ibid*, p.204 and see also *The Republic* 537b-c
[179] *Ibid*, p.205
[180] *Ibid*, p.205

4.3. Education of the philosopher------"dialectic" as the final stage of education

Plato defines that dialectic "is the ability to give and take account of something" (P.II, p.310).[181] According to Jaeger, if we want to make the Platonic meaning of dialectic clear, it is necessary for us to refer to the analogy of the cave (P.II, p.311).

In the analogy of the cave, we have already stated that *paideia* is a gradual process: when the free prisoner reaches world outside the cave, what his eyes see first are living animals, then the stars and finally the sun itself (P.II, p.311). In the same way, the man, who reaches knowledge through dialectic, is to reach the nature of everything without sense perception, and he will not stop until he comprehends the Idea of the Good (P.II, p.311). Plato says:

> In like manner, when anyone by dialectic attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable came to the goal of the visible (532a-b).

The "journey" (*poreia*) described above is "dialectic". Its goal is "to lead the best part of the soul (reason) up to the contemplation of what is best (the Good) among realities"(532c).

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[181] See also *The Republic* 531e

However, the above description of "dialectics" is too general. According to Jaeger, "the character (*tropos*) of dialectic can be defined only by its relation to the other types of knowledge" (P.II, p.311).

In Plato's theory of education, there are several ways of reaching the real nature of things, namely, empirical skills, mathematics and dialectic. Why does Plato think that dialectic is the only way to the nature of things? According to Plato, empirical skills deal mainly with opinion and desire only (533b). Hence they have nothing to do with knowledge. The mathematics gets closer to the true, but their starting-point—the hypotheses, as Taylor points out, "are synthetic in Kant's sense of the word, and they are assumed without proof".[182] Plato says:

> For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known, what possibility is there that assent in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science (533c)?

The mathematical hypotheses are something that the reasoner does not know and without proof. For this reason, mathematics cannot be converted into true knowledge. Dialectic is the only knowledge, which leads the soul up to the first principle—the

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[182] Taylor, *Plato: The Man and his Work*, p.291

Good. Plato says:

> Is not dialectic the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? (533d)

Dialectic treats the initial mathematical hypotheses as a starting-point, but not the first principle for the discovery of the Idea of the Good, which is "not postulated, but strictly self-evident, a real principle of everything".[183] A real dialectician is the man "who is able to exact an account of the essence of each thing" (534b). At the same time, he must be able to distinguish "the Idea of the Good" from all other things, which we call "good" and to delimit it by *logos* (534b-c).

As discussed above, dialectic needs the assistance of the mathematical hypotheses in order to reach to the Idea of the Good. Gosling has something to say on this point:

> In the *Republic*, in some way unrevealed, Plato thinks that as we progress up the hypotheses we shall reach the stage where we achieved an intuitive, and presumably self-guaranteeing, grasp of the Form of the Good, from which all else follows.[184]

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[183] *Ibid*, p.291 and see also *The Republic* 533c-d

From the mathematical hypotheses to the Idea of the Good: this last leap, however, is mysterious.[185] Taylor thinks that the Idea of the Good is apprehended by "direct acquaintance", not discursive "knowledge about it".[186] It is reasonable for both Gosling and Taylor to say so. Even Plato himself knows very clearly that is not possible to clarify this last leap.[187] So, the completion of the whole education proposal has to depend on some final intuitive vision.[188]

According to Plato, the training of dialectic should starts at the age of thirty and should last for 5 years (539e). From thirty-five to fifty the students must be tested again in the experienced reality by holding commands in war and other offices (539e-540a). And at the age of fifty their training is completed. The students now reach the Idea of the Good (540a). They should employ this highest Idea as a "model" for the right ordering of the state, the citizens and themselves (540a-b). They should spend most of their time studying on the one hand, and they are should always prepare themselves to serve the state on the other. They should take this task as their duty, but not an honour (540b). After educating the others to replace them as rulers, they shall depart to the Island of the Blest and dwell (540b-c). They will receive the honours

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[184] Gosling, *Plato*, p.107
[185] *Ibid*, p.107
[186] Cf. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and his Work*, p.231
[187] Cf. Gosling, *Plato*, p.107
[188] *Ibid*, p.108

after their deaths from the state (540c). Plato's description of the philosopher-king, or the ideal human personality ends here.

Chapter 5 Reconsideration on issues around the project of *Paideia*

Werner Jaeger's *Paideia* is a classical work in which the relationship between the concept of the ideal human personality and the concept of *paideia* is the focus. In this masterpiece, which is based on a great amount of text readings and careful analysis, Jaeger discloses to us that *paideia* is the conviction by which the Greeks cultivate the ideal personality.

In the whole *Paideia* project it is apparent that Plato's theory is the central object of attention and it occupies two volumes of the entire work. We may ask: what are the characteristics of Jaeger's reconstruction of Plato's thought?

5.1. Reconsideration of Jaeger's reconstruction of Plato's thought

First of all, Jaeger, "the first and foremost a great reader of texts",[189] provides us with a united point of view to understand Plato's dialogues—from his earlier dialogues such as *Meno* to his last works *The Laws* under one issue: *paideia*. The issue of *paideia*, according to Jaeger, is the cardinal issue which Plato tackles from his first work to his last.[190]

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[189] Charles H. Kahn, "Werner Jaeger's Portrayal of Plato" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger's Reconsidered*, p.72

[190] In P.II, p.96 Jaeger says, "When he (Plato) wrote the first words of his first Socratic dialogue, he knew the whole of which it was to be a part."

On the other hand, Jaeger provides us not only with a united view of Plato's dialogues under one subject, but also with another point of view of understanding Plato's thought within "the wider context of Greek cultural history since Homer, and to show how Plato succeeded in preserving and transforming the characteristic themes of Greek literature and morality by unifying them within the unique structure of his own philosophic world view".[191] This attempt, however, is seldom made by most Platonic scholars.

Unfortunately, *Paideia* is seldom read and is widely neglected today even though it is Jaeger's most important work on Plato. It is because Jaeger's analysis of Plato's theory of *paideia* is "unitarian rather than developmental", as Kahn points out.[192] For this reason, *Paideia* leaves no great influence on the Platonic scholarships today. Kahn says:

> Jaeger's view of Plato is unitarian rather than developmental; he sees a single philosophical position expressed from the early dialogues to the *Laws*, where most historically minded scholars have been concerned to plot consecutive stages in the evolution of Plato's thought. To this developmental enterprise Jaeger makes no contribution.[193]

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[191] Cf., Charles H. Kahn, "Werner Jaeger's Portrayal of Plato" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger's Reconsidered*,p.72
[192] *Ibid.*, p.71
[193] *Ibid.*, p.71

Jaeger's account of Plato is a unitarian one rather than a developmental one. As we have mentioned before, Jaeger's treatment of Plato's thought is under the central idea of *paideia*. Even we agree that Plato's dialogues are all written under this cardinal issue, we might see the evolution of Plato's thinking or how Plato departs from Socrates and develops his own thought from his earlier works to his last.[194] In *Paideia*, we do not see how Jaeger has contributed to the discussion of this important topic. Hence Kahn says "Jaeger's influence is absent from the major trends in Platonic scholarship today".[195]

Besides, it is apparent that in the whole *Paideia* project the Platonic theory of ideal personality and the theory of education are treated at great length. However, Jaeger's treatment of Plato's ideas is mainly a descriptive one because he shows no interest in the fundamental issues of Plato's theory, which are frequently debated by contemporary scholars. What is the advantage of the Platonic theory? What is its deficiency? Is the application of Plato's ideal to our contemporary world possible? These issues, however, are seldom discussed in *Paideia*. Furthermore, Jaeger has neither any interest in going beyond nor further developing the Platonic ideas as other

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[194] For example, we might see the difference of the teaching method in *Meno* and *The Republic* respectively: in *Meno* Plato (or Socrates) emphasizes on "dialogue" is the only teaching method while in *The Republic* Plato has shown us a systemic educational proposal.

[195] See, Charles H. Kahn, "Werner Jaeger's Portrayal of Plato" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger's Reconsidered*, p.70

Platonic scholars do. For example, in *Truth and Method* Gadamer intends to recognize and preserve the value of Platonic "question" and "answer" of teaching. What Gadamer does is far beyond this. Gadamer opens a new way of investigating the Platonic art of dialectic. The most important thing is: he develops "dialectic" into hermeneutics. However, we do not see any similar attempt in Jaeger's *Paideia.* For this reason, it is easy to explain why *Paideia* is rarely read by the Platonic scholars of today.

Even though *Paideia* is generally neglected at the present time, it leaves us two essential considerations: what should be the goal of education and what is the value of classics, especially Plato's philosophy in the education system today?

As frequently mentioned, Jaeger's three-volume classic *Paideia* provides us with a subject rarely explored—the relationship between the Greek ideal of human personality and the concept of *paideia.* Besides this purpose, Jaeger intends to recall the origin of education—shaping and making the true personality through this masterpiece. Jaeger says:

> I did not, however, take up this subject merely because I happened to observe that it had not yet been approached, but because I believed that a solution to this important historical and intellectual problem would bring a deeper understanding

> of the unique educational genius which is the secret of the undying influence of the Greece on all subsequent ages (P.I, ix)

Jaeger's another attempt is to recall the origin of education through the classical studies, especially Plato's. "Recalling the genius of education" is not only the theme of *Paideia*, but also the focus in his whole life. Jaeger tried very hard to preserve the value of classical studies, which was almost expelled from the German educational system in the later 19th century.[196] Jaeger believed that Greek *paideia*, especially that of Plato, is "a key to all salutary educational planning, indeed as the hallmark of all Western culture".[197] In the Berlin speech of the Classical School, Jaeger insisted that the pursuit of learning the Greek is to pursue the Greek *paideia*: neither for the sake of a later occupation nor for the sake of the state; it is for its own sake------for shaping our character as a human being.[198]

But two things we have to bear in mind: firstly, Jaeger does not mean that we should simply follow the Platonic educational scheme without any transformation. Indeed Jaeger believes that the Platonic educational theory or the Greek *paideia* not only provides some solutions for the crisis of education (or the crisis of culture) which

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[196] Cf. Donald O. White, "Werner Jaeger's 'Third Humanism' and the Crisis of Conservative Cultural Politics in Werner Germany" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*, p.274

[197] *Ibid.*, p.277

[198] Quoted by White in 'Third Humanism and the Crisis of Conservative Cultural Politics in Werner Germany" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*, p.278

Jaeger faced,[199] but also for the educational problem of people at the present and in the future. Instead of simply following Plato's model, people should convert it to something that can fulfill their needs (P.I, xv). Secondly, Jaeger keeps insisting that people should pursue the ideal personality. In Jaeger's view, however, the perfect human character does not mean the ideal philosopher-king in Plato's thought. Like Plato, Jaeger regards *paideia* as a practice concerning both the individual man and the state[200]. Every individual is able to shape his own character through performing the prescribed role he plays in the state. And he fulfills such role, as Jaeger said, neither for the sake of occupation nor for the state; it is for building his own character. So, it is obvious that the human character is not an ideal which is limited to a small group of people as Plato held. Ideal human personality is a goal that every individual should be able to and ought to pursue.

Historically, Jaeger's target of introducing Greek *paideia* into the German educational system ended in failure. Nowadays *Paideia* is generally neglected as Charles H. Kahn points out, but it does not mean that the Greek *paideia*, especially

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[199] See 'Third Humanism and the Crisis of Conservative Cultural Politics in Werner Germany" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*. The educational crisis means mainly the conflict between the classical education and the modern education in Germany of the early 20th century. Jaeger tried really hard to preserve the classical education. It was because Jaeger thought that the classical education was helpful to the political stability of Germany. See White's article for detail content.

[200] *Ibid.* See also Mortimer Chambers, "The Historian as Educator: Jaeger on Thucydides" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered.*

the Platonic one becomes meaningless in our time. Indeed the voices of reconsidering the goal of education and calling for the return of the Greek *paideia* has not vanished. Allan Bloom is one of the representatives.

5.2. Is Plato's philosophy of *paideia* still significant today? – Allan Bloom recalls for the importance of Plato's theory

Bloom in his book *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987) gives us a vivid picture of the problem of the American higher education at the end of the 20th century. However, what Bloom has stated is not limited to the current situation of the American educational system. Indeed he has pointed out a worldwide phenomenon of the present age.

What is the problem of today's education? Bloom discloses to us that it is the current emphasis on "relativism" and "openness", which are the products of the idea of liberal democracy.[201] The idea of openness, under which all claims to truth, all ways of life and all kinds of thought can be valid or invalid, is what the education of openness imposes on students. Students are no longer required to question and make any value judgments of good and bad, right and wrong because the students' minds

[201] Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p.26

are now open to everything. And "the man open to everything"— "the democratic personality" is the ideal personality that modern education intends to build up.[202]

Bloom argues that the idea of openness "has extinguished the real motive of education, the search of good life".[203] Under the premise of openness, everyone claims what they hold is the best and the truth because they are living in their own worlds. The idea of openness implies "we do not need others".[204] The consequence is that the students fail to see that there are many alternatives and possibilities, which are also good for their own life. Hence Bloom thinks what the education of openness brings forth is not "a great opening", it is indeed "a great closing". Like Plato and Jaeger, Bloom thinks that the purpose of education should be one enabling students to search for a good life. However, the educational commitment to openness "does not contribute to the meaningfulness of individual lives".[205] Bloom criticizes the so-called "openness" in the following terms:

> The most successful tyranny is not the one that uses force to assure uniformity but the one removes the awareness of other possibilities, that makes it seem inconceivable that other ways are viable, that removes the sense that there is an outside.[206]

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[202] *Ibid.*, p.27
[203] *Ibid.*, p.34
[204] *Ibid.*, p.34
[205] Patricia Rohrer, "Infinitely Interesting: Bloom, Kierkegaard, and the Educational Quest" in http://x.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-Yearbook/96_docs/rohrer.html, p.1

Bloom stresses if we want to investigate the meaning of life and search for the good life, we have to start with a question which is the most fundamental but the most difficult, that is, "What is man?"[207]

According to Bloom, natural sciences, social sciences and humanities assert their capacities of providing us with the answer to the question of "man". Under the theory of natural sciences, "man" is " another of the brutes, without the spiritually, soul, self, consciousness".[208] In the views of humanities and social sciences "man" is "not an animal or does not have a body".[209]According to Bloom, however, none of the above meanings can really cover the essence of "man". It is because the meaning of "man" is not a matter of theory; it is a matter of life. For this reason, we cannot expect sciences to be able to secure the way for this important enquiry.

Bloom stresses if we want to search for the meaning of man, it is necessary to return to the classics of the great philosophers because these great writers are the only ones who deals with this fundamental issue seriously.[210] "What is man?", as Socrates

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[206] Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind,* p.249
[207] *Ibid.*, p.21
[208] *Ibid.*, p.358
[209] *Ibid.*, p.358
[210] Andrew Cline, "Book Review: *The Closing of the American Mind*" in http://www.popecenter.org/clarion/1997/May_97/clinebkrvw.html, p.1

pointed out, is a question which is born in each of us.[211] But we have forgotten this important issue today. So the enquiry of man must start with one's own self, that is, "know thyself". Through self-examination, students may discover the finitude and limitation of their views on "man" and "good life"; they will search for other possibilities and alternatives because they have the desire to know.

Hence the real task of education is to help students to pose the question, "What is man", to themselves, to enable them "to understand that there are different ideas of what man is and that they must confront these ideas if they wish to lead meaningful life". [212] Life, as Bloom regards, will happen to the students, and no university is needed to provide it for them.[213] The university should act as a midwife, as Socrates did, to stimulate their thoughts to make choice that can lead them to approach their own human completeness.[214]

Both Jaeger and Bloom call for the return of classical studies, especially that of Plato. Like Jaeger, Bloom neither suggests that education should simply follow Plato's model nor everyone ought to be the philosopher-king. Unlike Jaeger, however,

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[211] Cf. Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind.*, p.21
[212] Cline, "Book Review: *The Closing of the American Mind*", p.2
[213] Cf. Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, p.21
[214] *Ibid.*, pp.19-20

Bloom neither intends to blame the present educational system by comparing it to the wonderful past;[215] nor adopts the Platonic model in reforming the present education system. Bloom says:

> The Platonic dialogues do not present a doctrine; they prepare the way for philosophizing. They are intended to perform the function of a living teacher who makes his students think, who knows which ones should be led further and which ones should be kept away from the mysteries, and who makes them exercises the same faculties and virtues in studying his words as they would have to use in studying nature and independently.[216]

Bloom recalls the importance of Plato's dialogues because they make the students truly think for their own life and guide them to make the best choice among numerous possibilities. Guiding the students to think for their own ways, however, is the task that the present education fails to accomplish.

5.3. Is Plato's philosophy inequalitarian? – Karl Pooper's and Martha Nussbaum's criticisms on Plato's theory of *paideia*

While Jaeger and Bloom try really hard to preserve the value of the Platonic theory of education, Karl Popper, however, strongly insists that Plato's theory must not be overestimated because Plato is one of the greatest enemies of modern

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[215] *Ibid.*, 202

[216] Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. with notes and an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom (New

democracy.[217] In his famous work *The Open Society And Its Enemies* Popper strictly distinguishes the Socratic practice of education from the Platonic one: the Socratic theory is equalitarian but the Platonic one is inequalitarian. For this reason, Socrates is a friend of the democratic society but Plato is identified as one of the greatest enemies of the open society.

Popper regards Socrates' theory as decidedly euqalitiarian because Socrates believes that everyone can be taught.[218] In *Meno*, the thought in which is considered to be derived from Socrates himself,[219] we see that Socrates teaches a young slave "a version of the now so-called theorem of Pythagoras" through questioning and answering, in an attempt to prove that education is possible to everyone; even the uneducated slave also has the capacity to learn.[220] Socrates' education, which implies the idea of equality, is the essence of the open society.

Even Martha Nussbaum, who is one of the supporters of recalling the importance of classics, shares the same view with Popper that there is an essential difference

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York : Basic Books, 1968), xvii

[217] In addition to Plato, Hegel and Marx are regarded as the greatest enemies of the open society.

[218] Popper, *The Open Society And Its Enemies,* p.129

[219] This view is shared by Lamb (Plato, *Plato II*, trans. W.R.M.Lamb, p.261) and Charles. H. Kahn, (Charles. H.Kahn, "Did Plato write Socratic Dialogues" in Hugh H. Benson ed., *Essay On The Philosophy of Socrates,* p.38).

[220] Popper, *The Open Society And Its Enemies,* p.129

between Socrates' view on education and Plato's. Socrates, as mentioned in *Cultivating Humanity*, questions everyone he meets. Unlike Plato who aims ultimately at building up the philosopher-king in his whole *paideia* project, Socrates' purpose is indeed to awaken self-criticism, that is, to "care for the soul". From Socrates' point of view an unexamined life is not worth living for human being. So, this sort of education of self-examination is of "essential importance for every human being". All human beings have the capacity to develop his intellectual faculty (reason) for life examination.[221] Nussbaum says:

> The historical Socrates is committed to awakening each and every person to self-scrutiny.[222]

"Education for every human being" which is the core of liberal education and of democracy, is directly derived from Socrates' spirit. Nussbaum criticizes:

> The extension of education to women, and also to slaves and poor people, followed directly from the Socratic sense of education's importance for every human being—combined with the recognition of a simple fact, that these people are also human, worthy of respect and concern.[223]

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[221] Martha C. Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 27-30
[222] *Ibid.*, p.26
[223] *Ibid.*, p.31

While Socrates' theory of education is regarded as equalitarian, the Platonic one is criticized as inequalitarian. Popper seriously attacks Plato's education theory on the ground that it is only for minority –the finest nature only; the majority (the common people), however, is excluded from his proposal. It is because the ultimate task of the Platonic education is to build up the ideal personality—the philosopher-king.[224] The Platonic educational monopoly of the finest nature indeed is fundamentally inequalitarian. And Nussbaum holds the same critical attitude towards Plato. She writes:

> Plato, by contrast, argues for the restriction of Socratic questioning to a small, elite group of citizens, who will eventually gain access to timeless metaphysical source of knowledge.[225]

Being one of the greatest enemies of liberal education, Plato's theory, Popper insists, must be erased from the open society. Facing these difficulties, what are the possible responses from Plato and Jaeger?

In *Paideia* we do not see any clear distinction between the Socrates' theory of education and the Platonic one as Popper and Nussbaum do,[226] but we may try to

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[224] Popper, *The Open Society And Its Enemies,* pp.127-132
[225] Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity: Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education,* p.26
[226] In *Paideia* we do not see that Jaeger has made such kind of clear distinction of Socrates' thought from the Platonic one. In "Werner Jaeger's Portrayal of Plato" in Calder III ed., *Werner Jaeger's Reconsidered,* p.73 Kahn says, "Turning now to Jaeger's account of Plato himself 〈 ..... 〉 There are

defend for Jaeger, and for Plato as well, in the following consideration.

First of all, Jaeger would not deny that there are differences between Socrates' thought and Plato's, as showed in *Meno* and *The Republic.* However, the fundamental elements of Plato's theory indeed is derived from and compatible with Socrates' ideas. In the aspect of educational methods, as Popper and Nussbaum point out, Socrates believes in the method of "question" and "answer"—dialogue which places the individuals in a relationship to speak, soul to soul. And it is beyond doubt that "dialogue" occupies an important role in Plato's education project, though Plato does have a systemic proposal besides "dialogue" (music, gymnastics, mathematics), which Socrates lacks.

Besides regarding the purpose of education, Socrates, unlike his pupil, whose education proposal aims ultimately at building up the ideal personality, wants to awaken the individuals to examine their life, to care for their own souls and to search for their own ways. The ultimate aim of Plato's education is to mould the ideal personality—the philosopher-king which is limited to the minority of finest nature after all. However, according to Plato's thought, education is for all but not for the

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earlier Socratic dialogues, but no distinct Socratic stage in Plato's philosophical development."

finest nature only.[227] Hence Plato aims also at educating the majority to fully develop their capacities and to care for their own life, that is to say to live according to "justice"—each man performs one's social service in the state for which his nature is best adapted (*The Republic* 433a).

From the above discussions, we might conclude that the fundamental principles of Plato's theory are originated from and compatible with Socrates' ideas even though there are some slight differences between them. Now, it is time to come back to Popper's and Nussbaum's criticism to see whether or not Socrates' theory is equalitarian and Plato's one is inequalitarian.

Popper's and Nussbaum's criticism focus mainly on the matter of "equality of education". From their views we may conclude that their sense of equality has two meaning: "equal opportunity of receiving education" and "educating people in the same way in all matters". First of all, if we refer to the former sense of equality, both Popper's and Nussbaum's criticisms are inappropriate, to which Robin Barrow rises his objection. Barrow, who holds a contrary view to Popper's and Nussbaum's, tries very hard to defend that it is a mistake to conclude that Plato does not want to educate

[227] It is the main challenge from Popper and Nussbaum that Plato's education is for the majority, we are going to discuss in detail soon

the majority.[228] In fact Plato himself specifically refers to the education of the majority more than once in *The Republic*.[229] For example:

> Very well, I will. And yet I hardly know how to find the audacity or the words to speak and undertake to persuade first the rulers and themselves and the soldiers and then the rest of the city, that in good sooth all our training and education of them were things that they imagined and that happened to them as it were in a dream; but that in reality at that time they were born within the earth being moulded and fostered themselves while their weapons and the rest of their equipment were being fashioned. (414 d)

Plato has never excluded the majority from his education proposal. On the contrary, Platonic education, just as Socrates does, is open to all human beings. Every human being has an equal opportunity of education in Plato's proposal.

Is Plato's theory inequalitarian if we refer to the latter sense of equality—educating all people in the same way in all matters? This sense of equality, however, is rejected by Plato immediately. He says:

> These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike! (*The Republic* 558c)

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[228] Barrow, *Plato and Education*, p.28. G.C.Field shares the same view with Barrow. See G.C.Field, "On Misunderstanding Plato" in Renford Bambrough ed., *Plato, Popper and Politics* (Cambridge : Heffer ; New York : Barnes & Noble, 1967), pp. 80-81

[229] Barrow, *Plato and Education*, p.28

If we relate the above dialogue in the field of education, it is clear that Plato objects to the notion of educating all individuals in the same way without considering the difference of capacity among individuals.[230] Plato says in *The Republic* that the state is composed of three different social classes which correspond to three different capacities in the soul: the working-class to "desire", the guardians to "spirit" and the philosophers to "reason". Even if we do not accept such kind of classification, it is difficult for us to reject that there is real difference of capacity among people. For this reason, Plato in his education proposal "conceives of more than one kind of education, and thinks that each of the three groups of citizens in the Republic is being educated in a manner appropriate to it".[231] It is because in the Platonic sense of equality (justice) is: each individual should be educated in the way that can help him to fully develop his capacity, but not to treat all human beings in the same way. Barrows says:

> And what he (Plato) is demanding instead when he asks for unequal treatment of unequals, is that in so far as there are differences between people these differences should be taken into account, and, if they prove to be relevant differences in respect of the distribution of something specific, they should lead one to treat people differently.[232]

Hence, it is apparent that Plato never excludes the majority—the working-class from

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[230] *Ibid.*, p.29
[231] *Ibid.*, p.28
[232] *Ibid.*, p.29

his proposal. On the contrary, he insists that all the human beings should share the same kind of education corresponding to their capacities.

There is still one important question: Who should be educated as a guardian or as a philosopher? Why does the majority possess the soul within which "desire" plays the dominant role and they can only stay at the first stage of education; while within the souls of philosophers "reason" is the dominant capacity and they can attain the highest degree of education? Are all these determined by nature or by education and the environment?[233]

However, Plato's answer to this is not very clear.[234] Sometimes he tends to believe that "the individuals are born with an innate nature which is permanent",[235] hence he seems to suggest that the classification in one class or another can take place at birth.[236] Even though Plato also believes the possibility of migration of classes,[237]

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[233] *Ibid.*, p.30
[234] *Ibid.*, p.30
[235] *Ibid.*, p.30
[236] *Ibid.*, p.30 For example, in *The Republic* 459d-e Plato writes: "All that was right," he said. "In our marriage, then, and the procreation of children, it seems there will be no slight need of this kind of right.' " "How so?" "It follow from our former admission," I said, "that the best men must cohabit with the best women in as many cases as possible and the worst with the worst in the fewest, and that the offspring of the one must be reared and that of the other not, if the flock is to be as perfect as possible."
[237] In *The Republic* 415a-c Plato states: "It was quite natural that I should be," I said; "but all the same hear the rest of the story. While all of you in the city are brothers, we sill say in our tale, yet God in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule mingled gold in their generation, for which reason they are the most precious—but in the helpers silver, and iron and brass in the farmers and other craftsmen. And as you are all akin, though for the most part you will breed after your kinds, it may sometimes happen that a golden father would beget a silver son and that a golden offspring would come from a silver sire and that the rest would in like manner be born of one another. So that the first

he tends to think it shows only "that mistakes might have been made at the initial classification rather than people's natures might change as time passed."[238] In this way, Plato seems to believe that the people's natures are determined. But, is it really the case?

As Barrow states, Plato recognizes that the initial nature is an important factor in classification of classes because he believes that initial nature does play a part "at least in determining the likelihood or the potentially of an individual nature to develop in one way or another".[239] However, he accepts also that "the potency of environmental influence" does play a role in developing a particular kind of nature.[240] For example, under some circumstances the rational part of the soul can be strong enough to realize itself in almost any conditions and hence the individual is placed in the class of philosophers. But in other cases the matter of realizing the rational faculty is determined by the nature of the environment in which it grows.[241] Plato writes:

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and chief injunction that the god lays upon the rulers is that of nothing else are they to be such careful guardians and so intently observant as of the intermixture of these metals in the souls of their offspring, and if sons are born to them with an infusion of brass or iron they shall by no means give away to pity in their treatment of them, but shall assign to each the status due to his nature and thrust them out among the artisans or the farmers. And again, if from these there is born a son with unexpected gold or silver in his composition they shall honour such and bid them go up higher, some to the office of guardian, some to the assistanceship, alleging that there is an oracle that the state shall then be overthrown when the man of iron or brass is its guardian. Do you see any way of getting them to believe this tale?"

[238] Barrow, *Plato and Education*, p.30

[239] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31

[240] *Ibid.*, p.30

> "No," he said. "I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy?" "None whatever," I said; "but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity of to-day is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause if its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out into the native growth, so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices." (*The Republic* 479b-c)

But in the whole matter of the migration of classes, Plato stresses mainly on the power of education to transform people's nature:

> "Then," said I, "Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed soul become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its nurture, while a real nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?" "No," he said, "that is the case." (491e)

To Plato, it is no doubt that the initial nature does play a role in determining the potentiality of an individual; however, whether or not the potentiality can be fully developed indeed depends on the right kind of education.[242] And, the potency of environmental influence has a role in deciding the people's natures as well. However, what Plato emphasizes most is the role played by "education" in altering people's natures. Even in the most suitable environment an individual of the best nature

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[241] *Ibid*, p.31

individual might degenerate into the worst one if he is under bad education. So, we may conclude that in Plato's view "the initial nature", "the potency of environmental influence" and "education" are all factors in determining the distribution of classes, but "education" is the most important, or even the most determinant factor among the three. Barrow says:

> The individual is not born with a specific aptitude, rather the aptitude of each one of us is the product is the product of the external influences that play upon us while we develop, combined, perhaps, with some innate tendencies; to disentangle the natural tendencies and the effects of external influence seems, in our present state of knowledge, an impossible task.[243]

In short, Plato's theory of education is not inequalitarian, as Popper and Nussbaum criticize. Plato, like his master Socrates, insists that every human being should have a share in education and everyone should receive the kind of education which corresponds to their natures. Offering different kinds of education to students with different natures so as to help them to develop their own capacities and to search for their own life, however, is the task that democratic education of today fails to accomplish.

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[242] *Ibid.*, p.31

[243] See Robin Barrow, *Plato, utilitarianism and education* (London; Boston : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p.149

Chapter 6 Conclusion

This thesis attempts to follow the second volume of Werner Jaeger's masterwork *Paideia,* which is the basis of a reinterpretion of the Platonic dialogues to illustrate the relationship between the concept of *paideia* (education) and the concept of the ideal human personality in the philosophy of Plato.

To sum up, *paideia,* which is a lifelong process of transforming the human personality into the true, real and genuine nature, is the conviction by which the Greeks construct the ideal personality. In the Western world, the Greeks are the first to recognize that education means establishing the personality in accordance with an ideal (P.I, xxii). Building the ideal human personality is the common goal of the ancient Greek educators, poets, artists and philosophers.

Building the ideal human personality means the actualization of *areté*, which means every kind of virtue. *Areté* is a developmental concept, its meaning differs in different epochs. Hence, the meaning of the ideal human personality changes in different times as well. For example, *areté* in Homeric epic means mainly "courage"; hence Homeric sense of the ideal human personality is "a courageous man" (P.I, p.7)

while in Tyrtaeus' poetry "justice" and "a just man" (P.I, 105).

Plato's theory of the ideal human personality in *The Republic* is the center of discussion of the second volume of Jaeger's *Paideia*, and also of this thesis. It is because *The Republic* is "revealed as the high point of Plato's educational activity" (P.II, p.96).

What is Plato's concept of the ideal human personality? Like his master Socrates, Plato regards that both "soul" and "body" represent different aspects of human nature. Soul, which ranks higher than body, is the most precious thing of man. Hence, Plato's ultimate interest in his *paideia* is the human soul.

Plato's *paideia* aims at actualizing *areté*, which is essential to the human soul, and building up the ideal human personality. But unlike his predecessors, Plato's task is not to actualize one specific kind of virtues such as "courage", "justice" or "wisdom". Indeed, Platonic *paideia* aims at "virtue as a whole"—"virtue in itself", by which "courage", "justice" and "wisdom" deserve the name "virtues". In Plato's sense, "virtue in itself" is knowledge, which exists already within the interior of the soul. But the soul has forgotten knowledge when it combines with the body. For this reason,

virtue can neither be taught nor be obtained through training. It is by "recollection" that the soul regains its self-knowledge and its self-perfection. For this reason, "recollection" is the target of Plato's *paideia*.

According to Plato, "self-perfection" is not possible to everyone. Self-perfection, however, is limited to the philosophers only. Only the philosophers should achieve the highest education. Hence Plato focuses on the education of the philosophers in his educational scheme. First of all, "music" and "gymnastics" are introduced as the first stage of education; "Mathematics" comes next and finally "dialectic". And Plato's description of the philosophers' education ends here.

Apart from providing us a subject rarely explored—the relationship between the Greek ideal human personality and the concept of *paideia*, Jaeger also intends to recall the original meaning of *paideia* and the importance of Plato's philosophy in the field of education. Allan Bloom, who stands on Jaeger's side, calls for the return to the classics today. It is because the great philosophers of classics are the ones who deal with the fundamental issue of man—the meaning of life. And Plato's dialogues make students think truly for their own life, which is the most important goal that the present education fails to accomplish. But, Popper and Nussbaum, against Jaeger and

Bloom, regard Plato's theory of education as inequalitarian because his education proposal is limited to the small group of the best nature. For this reason, Plato should be strongly criticized because he is one of the greatest enemies of the democratic society of today.

Even though Jaeger's *Paideia* is rarely read and ignored by the modern scholars, he left us some important questions for serious thinking: What should be the goal of education? Is it for the sake of occupation, money, or caring of the soul? And, should we abandon the classics and pursuit only for the sciences? These significant questions are what Jaeger intended to solve in the thirties and are what we have to rethink of today. About these enquiries, however, I do not think that it is a matter of choice; it is indeed a matter of how to keep a balance between them without going to the extremes. We need sciences, but we need classics as well; we need money and occupation, but we need to care for our souls at the same time. How to keep a balance between soul and occupation, between classics and science? It is an important issue for us to ponder seriously.

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